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INTRODUCTION
Of all the proposals advanced in recent years to reform Subchapter
K, the part of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC" or "Code") governing
partnership tax, perhaps none has generated more acrimony and confusion
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than the pending carried interest legislation contained in proposed § 710.1
While reformers have framed the issue of taxing the compensatory portion
of a service partner's return as ordinary income in terms of distributive
justice, critics have been quick to invoke the rhetoric of class warfare to
2fend off reform. In the most elementary terms, the carried interest
legislation would tax some (but not all) of a service partner's share of
partnership profits as ordinary income.3 Even at this basic level, however,
the contours of the proposed legislation are ambiguous. Indeed, the reform
is sometimes misdescribed as taxing "distributions" rather than "distributive
shares" as ordinary income, a distinction that is fundamental. 4 Moreover,
the precise tax advantage of carried interest arrangements depends crucially
on whether one adopts a "joint-tax" perspective or focuses more narrowly
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references to the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.) are to the I.R.C. as currently in effect. References to Proposed § 710 (Prop. § 710)
refer to the version introduced by Representative Sander Levin in April 2009. H.R. 1935.
111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Levin Bill]. See also Tax Extenders Act of 2009, H.R.
4213, 111th Cong. (2009). The current legislation is similar to the Alternative Minimum
Tax Relief Act of 2008, H.R. 6275, 110th Cong. (2008). The Senate Finance Committee
held relevant hearings on July 11, 2007, and July 31, 2007. S. Finance Comm., Hearing on
Carried Interest (2007) [hereinafter Senate Hearings], available at
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing07l 107.htm (Part I) and
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing073107.htm (Part II) (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
The House Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on Sept. 6, 2007. H. Ways & Means
Comm., Hearing on Fair and Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working Families (2007)
[hereinafter House Hearing], available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Hearings/transcript.aspx?NewslD=10305 (last visited Feb.
14, 2010).
2. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (2008) ("Distributive justice, of course, is also a
concern."); House Hearing, supra note I (Statement of Victor Fleischer), at 7 ("A few
professors have been retained by the private equity industry to argue for the status quo: there
may be a handful of others who independently support the status quo. but they are few and
far between."); Howard E. Abrams. Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform That Did Not
Happen. 40 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 197, 227 (2009) ("Professor Fleischer framed the carried
interest issue largely in class-warfare terms, with private equity and hedge managers as the
bad guys.").
3. The proposed reform bears a superficial resemblance to proposals set forth by
Mark Gergen nearly two decades ago that would tax service partners on compensation when
they receive disproportionate allocations relative to their capital account balances. See Mark
P. Gergen. Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners. 48 TAX L. REV. 69,
105 (1992) (claiming that the proposed system would be "very much like subchapter S").
4. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 59 (describing the legislative proposal as "treat[ing]
carried interest distributions as ordinary income"). A partner is taxed on his distributive
share of partnership income when realized at the partnership level, whether or not
distributed. See I.R.C. § 702(a) (2009) (inclusion of distributive share); cf I.R.C. § 731
(2009) (taxing distributions). To the extent that earnings are not currently distributed,
accounting for "reinvested" implicit salary greatly complicates the actual operation of the
proposed legislation.
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on the service partner's opportunity for deferral and conversion.! Apart
from the merits of carried interest legislation, there is also considerable
dispute over whether such reform is likely to raise significant amounts of
6
revenue.
The Administration's budget proposals for fiscal year 2010 contain
a carried interest provision that appears to adopt the general framework of
H.R. 1935 (the Levin Bill) introduced in 2009.' Under this approach, a
service partner's distributive share of income would be recharacterized as
ordinary income, regardless of whether such income would otherwise be
treated as lower-taxed capital gain or dividend income at the partnership
level.8 The proposal would also treat gain on sale of a service partner's
interest as ordinary income, subject to certain exceptions. As the reason
for the change, the budget proposal refers to the "unfair and inefficient tax
preference" resulting from allowing service partners to "receive capital
gains treatment on labor income," particularly in view of the "recent
explosion of activity among large private equity firms." 0 In its present
form, the Levin bill reflects key recommendations of the partnership tax bar
which has intensely scrutinized the technical operation of the carried
5. The leading article applying a joint-tax perspective in the context of partnership
profits interests is Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage of Paying Private Equity
Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071
(2008). Other commentators have employed a similar joint-tax perspective in the corporate
area. See generally Michael S. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A
Joint Tax Perspective. 59 SMU L. REV. 721 (2006): David I. Walker, Is Equity
Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REv. 695 (2004).
6. See, e. g., Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests:
Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 115, 161 (2008) (concluding that, even in the absence of "alternative
structures to undo the effect of any reform." carried interest legislation is likely to raise
"relatively little revenue"). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 128 (May 2009) (Table
1) [hereinafter Greenbook]. This Article does not discuss the plethora of anti-abuse rules
intended to prevent circumvention of the proposed legislation.
7. See Greenbook, supra note 6, at 23-24. Unlike the Levin bill which specifically
targets investment service partnerships, the Administration's proposal would apparently
apply broadly to all service partnerships. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N,
DESCRIPTION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR
2010 PROPOSAL 120 22 (Sept. 2009) (JCS-2-09) (noting issues related to the "complexity.
administrability and scope" of the Administration's broader proposal).
8. See Greenbook. supra note 6. at 23. A profits share taxed as ordinary income to
the service partner would also be subject to self-employment tax. See id. To prevent
circumvention of the legislation through use of separate entities, the budget proposal would
treat income or gain from a "disqualified interest" as ordinary income. See id. at 24.
9. See id. at 23 (treating gain on sale as ordinary income to the extent that such gain is
not attributable to invested capital).
10. Id.
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interest proposals." By contrast, academic proponents of carried interest
legislation have generally suggested that the technical problems are
solvable and need not impede reform. 12  The partnership tax bar's
recommendations would add flexibility and electivity while making the
proposed legislation considerably more complex. The emerging consensus
seems to be that the current legislation has "the potential to be workable" if
only Congress heeds the partnership tax bar's recommendations to remedy
existing defects.' 3
In view of the often highly-charged and polemical nature of the
carried interest debate, it is important to understand the most significant
policy and technical choices underlying the current legislation. Despite the
intuitive appeal of taxing service partners at ordinary income rates on labor
income, the case for reform is much more nuanced and the proposed
solution considerably more complex than has sometimes been suggested.14
Economically, use of a carried interest arrangement rather than salary does
not actually convert ordinary income into capital gain but rather merely
reallocates different types of income among partners, while leaving
unchanged aggregate capital gain at the partnership level. To use a simple
example, assume that a partnership has $100 of capital gain and can choose
to pay deductible salary of $20 to an investment manager or, alternatively,
reallocate $20 of the partnership's capital gain to the investment manager.
In this instance, the carried interest arrangement substitutes capital gain (the
manager's share of partnership profits) for ordinary compensation income
but deprives investor partners of an equal and offsetting compensation
deduction (or capitalized expense).
In light of the furor over carried interests, it may be worth
emphasizing that such income reallocation generally does not offer a joint-
tax advantage (or disadvantage) if all parties are taxed at the same rates on
ordinary income and capital gain.15 The reallocation affects the amount of
11. See generally New York State Bar Association Tax Section. Report on Proposed
Carried Interest Legislation and Fee Deferral Legislation (Sept. 28, 2008) [hereinafter
NYSBA Report]; ABA Section of Taxation, Comments on H.R. 2834 (Nov. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter ABA Comments].
12. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, A Pragmatic Case for Taxing an Equity Fund
Manager's Profits Share As Compensation, 87 TAXES 139, 149 (2009) (noting that "[m]any
of the problems that have been raised ... are technical in nature and solvable").
13. See Paul Carman. Taxation of Carried Interests. 87 TAXES I11. 134 (2009); see
also Michael L. Schler. Taxing Partnership Profits Income As Compensation Income, 119
TAX NOTES 829, 853 (2008) (describing the current approach as a "practical solution to a
difficult problem").
14. See Sanchirico, supra note 5; David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried
Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008); see also Schler, supra note 13, at 853
(noting that "complexity will be inevitable").
15. To illustrate, assume that all parties are taxed on capital gains at 15% and on
4 [Vol. 1:1
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taxes paid, respectively, by the manager and investors (the manager pays
less tax and the investors pay more tax) but total taxes remain unchanged.
Because aggregate tax liability is the same, the parties may be expected to
alter payments to each other so that their net income (after taxes) remains
constant. 16 If the investors are tax-exempt (or tax-indifferent), however, the
carried interest arrangement decreases the service partner's tax without any
offsetting increase in the other partners' tax.' 7  Notwithstanding the tax
tensions among same-taxed partners that normally suffice to limit such tax-
advantageous income reallocation, reformers have claimed that the private
equity model revealed fundamental flaws in the taxation of partnership
profits interests.' 8
ordinary income at 35%. The two alternative compensation arrangements (carry versus
cash) result in the same aggregate tax liability ($15); under the carried interest arrangement,
the investment manager pays $4 less tax ($3 versus $7) but taxable investors pay $4 more
tax ($12 versus $8):
Taxable Income Tax Liability
Carried Salary Carried Salary
Interest Interest
Investment manager 20 CG 20 01 3 7
Taxable investors 80 CG 100 CG - 20 01 12 15- 7
Total 100 CG 100 CG 15 15
16. Regardless of which party bears the nominal tax burden, a compensation
arrangement is neutral as long as the parties' aggregate tax liability is the same. See, e.g.,
Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C.
L. REV. 571, 580 (2007); Alan D. Viard, The Taxation of Carried Interests: Understanding
the Issues, 61 NAT'L TAx J. 445. 450 (2008) (noting that "the parties can and should alter
their payments to each other" to keep net income unchanged).
17. By comparison, use of carry (rather than cash) reduces the partners' aggregate tax
liability by $4 when the investor partners are tax-exempt:
Tax Liability
Carried Interest Salary
Investment manager 3 7
Tax-exempt investors 0 0
Total 3 7
The reduction in the partners' aggregate tax liability is equal to the 20 percentage point gap
between the investment manager's rate on ordinary income (35%) and rate on capital gains
(15%). The relevant rate gap for tax-exempt investors is zero, i.e., they bear no tax on
capital gain or ordinary income: thus, the income reallocation saves joint taxes equal to the
entire difference ($4) between the investment manager's capital gain tax ($3) and ordinary
income tax ($7). See Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1114 (noting significance of difference in
the partners' rate gaps).
18. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4 (claiming that "the status quo is untenable as a
matter of tax policy").
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Although some commentators have argued that private equity
carried interests might be used even if they offered no particular tax
advantages, 19 Part I of this Article suggests that these tax-motivated
arrangements were clearly vulnerable under existing partnership rules that
seek to limit capital-gain conversion and joint-tax minimization. Part II of
the Article examines critically the compromise approach of § 710, together
with the partnership tax bar's recommended amendment of § 83. Touted as
a simple solution to conversion and deferral, the recharacterization
approach of § 710 may simply mask the inherent problems of
distinguishing between labor and capital income when a service partner's
earnings are reinvested in the partnership and give rise to "qualified
capital."2 0 Tracking the separate labor and capital components of a service
partner's return when earnings are reinvested is part of a much larger
problem when a business owner-manager invests both services and capital
in an enterprise. This problem is exacerbated to the extent a service
provider can receive a partnership profits interest tax free and be recognized
as a partner even though his claim to a share of the partnership's capital is
contingent on a performance goal. From the partnership tax bar's
perspective, the current legislation offers a long-awaited opportunity to
disentangle treatment of profits interests from § 83, the general provision
governing deferred compensation.21 Given the joint-tax incentives that §
710 provides to overstate investment return (and understate compensatory
return), Part III concludes that a better approach may be to treat a service
partner's profits share entirely as ordinary income even if implicit salary is
reinvested in the partnership's business, by analogy to the treatment of
restricted stock or nonqualified options.
While allaying the concerns of the partnership tax bar may be a
practical imperative, it is abundantly clear that § 710, if enacted, will be
neither simple nor straightforward. Given the political salience and
technical opacity of the carried interest problem, Congress might be well
advised to delegate to Treasury authority under existing provisions to
address capital-gain conversion rather than enact a complex statute of
19. See Weisbach, supra note 14. at 726 (suggesting that "the structure of these funds
is no more tax-driven than any typical investment").
20. See Prop. § 710(c)(2)(A) and (C) (exempting from ordinary income treatment
reasonable allocations attributable to a service partner's qualified capital, including
previously-taxed but undistributed earnings). The qualified capital exception under the
Levin bill was expanded in response to recommendations of the partnership tax bar; it is not
clear whether the Administration's budget proposal follows this approach.
21. See proposed § 83(a)(4) (treating the fair market value of a profits interest as equal
to its liquidation value (zero) and deeming the recipient to have made a § 83(b) election).
The revision to § 83 was added to the Levin bill as a new "Section F that appears
immediately before "Section 2" containing proposed § 710.
6 [Vol. 1: 1
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uncertain scope and effectiveness.
I. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: ALLOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
If the tax advantage of private equity managers is properly viewed
as a special form of joint-tax arbitrage, it is essential to understand how the
partnership rules facilitate or limit such joint-tax minimization. A typical
private equity fund is a self-liquidating partnership: both investors and the
investment manager receive cash distributions at roughly the same time as
the partnership recognizes gain from sale of investments and allocates that
gain among partners. Because the manager typically does not reinvest
capital earned from services in the partnership, taxing distributive shares
may be equivalent to taxing distributions. If the fund is insufficiently
profitable when it liquidates, the manager may be required to return only
unearned after-tax distributions which represent essentially interest-free
22loans from the investor partners. Given the highly unusual nature of
private equity arrangements that are structured to provide tax benefits to
managers that are often intentionally opaque even to investors, it may be
hazardous to draw any generalizations concerning how traditional
partnership profits interests should be taxed.
A. Understanding the Business Arrangements That Prompted
Proposed § 710
Although the structure and business model of private equity funds
have attracted considerable public attention, the operation of the tax
provisions is generally less well understood.23  The typical business
arrangement is as follows. Assume the general partner (GP) of a private
equity fund is an individual who provides management services, and the
investors (LP) are tax-exempt entities (unless otherwise specified).24  The
22. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
23. This Article does not discuss hedge funds, which share some common
characteristics with private equity funds but raise distinct tax issues. Since hedge funds
typically generate mainly short-term capital gain (taxed at the same rate as ordinary income).
they arguably do not pose the same problem. See Adam H. Rosenzweig. Not All Carried
Interests Are Created Equal. 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 713, 715 (2009).
24. In reality, the general partnership interest is likely to be held by a management
company organized as a partnership or an LLC; the equity owners of the management
company are private equity professionals. Since the management company is a flow-
through entity, the tax consequences are generally the same as if the private equity
professionals held the general partnership interest directly. The investors are likely to be a
composite oftax-exempt entities (e.g., private and governmental employee benefit plans and
7
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fund is organized as a partnership (P), although the result would generally
be the same if P were instead an LLC taxed as a partnership. P seeks to
acquire control of portfolio companies, increase the value of the portfolio
companies, and "monetize" the return on LP's investment over a period of
several years.25 GP receives solely a profits interest in exchange for
services; since GP contributes no capital to P, there is no need to bifurcate
26GP's interest between a capital and a profits component. Over time, GP
will acquire a capital interest in P to the extent of GP's share of any
previously taxed but undistributed profits; if all profits are distributed
currently, GP never acquires a capital interest. Prior to liquidation, GP
shares in distributions to the extent that current realized gains exceed the
- - 27aggregate excess of losses over gains on investments sold in prior years.
P imposes a clawback obligation on GP to the extent that GP has a negative
capital account on liquidation attributable to "unearned" distributions.2
The following example illustrates the typical business arrangement and the
close economic resemblance between a profits interest and an option.
Example (1)-Earned Carry. In exchange for managing P's
business, GP receives a 20% profits interest; LP contributes $40 million and
is entitled to the remaining 80% of P's profits. LP is not entitled to a
preferred return or minimum return on investment ("hurdle rate"). In Year
1, P makes four portfolio investments (A, B, C, and D) of $10 million each.
At the end of Year 2, P sells A for $15 million; at the end of Year 3, P sells
university endowments), foreign individuals, and wealthy U.S. individuals. This Article
ignores the possibility that some portion of U.S. tax-exempt investors' return may be
unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). See I.R.C. § 512 (2009).
25. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 8-9. Since LP is "locked into" P until disposition of
all the portfolio companies, LP's capital is returned only as P distributes proceeds from the
sale of individual portfolio companies. See Knoll, supra note 6, at 122-23.
26. To ensure partner status, GP would typically contribute capital (1%): GP would
also be entitled to a management fee (2%). If the rights of GP's capital interest are identical
to those of LP's, the price paid by LP provides a proxy for the fair market value of GP's
capital interest. Cf Carman, supra note 13, at 124-25 (comparing non-U.S. solutions to the
carried interest problem, including allowing non-service partners to invest in carried interest
units).
27. See Andrew W. Needham & Anita Beth Adams, Private Equity Funds, 735 B.N.A.
TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO A-8 to A-9 (2005) (describing "realized aggregation" method).
Other approaches to the timing of distributions may be more or less favorable to GP. See
JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY. AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
TRANSACTIONS 1003 (2008).
28. The clawback obligation is a contingent recourse obligation to repay all or a
portion of distributions received prior to liquidation so that GP's cumulative distributions
coincide with the profit-sharing formula. See JAMES M. SCHELL, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS:
BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS 1-9 (1999). If GP is organized as a limited liability
entity, LP may insist on guarantees to ensure that the contractual obligation is satisfied. See
id at 2-26.
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B for $8 million; and at the end of Year 4, P sells C for $12 million.
Finally, at the beginning of Year 5, P sells D for $10 million and liquidates.
At the end of Year 2, P realizes gain of $5 million on sale of A ($15
million less $10 million basis). To recoup LP's investment in A, P
distributes the first $10 million of sales proceeds to LP; the remaining $5
million is distributed $4 million to LP and $1 million to GP (in the same
manner as the realized gain of $5 million is allocated). Even though GP
receives a distribution of $1 million at the end of Year 2, GP's carry is not
"earned" until LP's aggregate invested capital is fully returned.29 Prior to
liquidation, the partnership recognizes net gain of $5 million ($5 million
gain on A less $2 million loss on B plus $2 million gain on C and zero gain
on D). Overall, GP receives $1 million (the earned carry) and LP receives
$44 million ($40 million plus 80% of the $5 million net gain).
In economic terms, GP's profits interest is indistinguishable from
an option, i.e., the ability to benefit from an increase in appreciation without
risking capital.o If GP had an option on 20% of the net increase in the
value of P ($5 million), GP would recognize $1 million of ordinary income
upon exercise of the option; the tax would be deferred from grant until
exercise of the option; all of the partnership's capital gain would be taxed to
LP, and P would be treated as paying over compensation of $1 million to
GP on exercise of the option, with a corresponding deduction (or
31
capitalized expense). Under the profits alternative, GP's carry of $1
million is instead taxed entirely as long-term capital gain, saving GP the
difference between the capital gain rate and the ordinary income rate. By
comparison to an economically equivalent option, profits treatment
accelerates taxation of GP, since GP is taxed when partnership income is
allocated to him (whether or not distributed). Despite acceleration of the
tax, profits treatment produces a more favorable tax result overall because it
allows GP to convert ordinary income into capital gain. Moreover, profits
treatment permits GP to extract early cash distributions tax free that may
nevertheless need to be repaid later.
Despite the economic resemblance of a profits interest to an option,
the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") will generally respect the partner
status of a service provider who receives a profits interest falling within the
29. See SCHELL. supra note 28, at 2-21 (noting that the profitability of the investment
cannot "be known with certainty until [P] is liquidated and wound up").
30. See Knoll, supra note 6, at 133 (noting that "a carried interest is effectively a call
option."). A profits interest closely mimics a nonqualified stock option (NQSO) or incentive
stock option (ISO). See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4.
31. Upon exercise of the option, the holder acquires a capital interest; grant of the
option is not a taxable event. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-7(a) (as amended in 2004), 1.83-6(a)
(as amended in 2003).
9
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administrative guidelines of Revenue Procedures 93-27 and 2001-43.3 A
private equity carried interest does not, however, fall within the literal terms
of the administrative safe harbor, since the holder typically receives both a
capital interest and a disproportionate profits interest.33  Nevertheless,
taxpayers may claim that the carried interest can be bifurcated into separate
capital and profits components for purposes of qualifying the profits interest
under the safe harbor.34 Alternatively, taxpayers may simply claim a zero
value based on the confused state of current law, relying on the
government's perceived unwillingness to challenge even patently erroneous
valuations. If receipt of the profits interest is not taxed up front, GP is
taxed on his distributive share of partnership profits under the normal flow-
through rules of § 702(b). 6
When LP is tax exempt (or otherwise tax indifferent), GP
essentially "swaps" ordinary income for capital gain at no tax cost to LP,
since a deduction for GP's implicit salary would be worthless to LP.
32. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191. In
2005. the Service issued proposed regulations addressing compensatory transfers of
partnership interests. See Proposed Regulations on Partnership Equity Transfers for
Services, REG-105-346-03, 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (May 24, 2005) [hereinafter REG-105-346-
03]; Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 122 (containing proposed revenue procedure). The 2005
proposed regulations were generally consistent with the Service's prior administrative
guidance. which would have become obsolete had the proposed regulations become final.
33. See Carman. supra note 13, at 114 (noting that a carried interest does not "literally
fall within" the safe harbor); cf Fleischer, supra note 2, at 12 ("The typical carried interest
finds ample shelter in the proposed rules."). By allowing a liquidation-value election for all
compensatory partnership interests (capital or profits), the 2005 proposed regulations would
have extended safe harbor treatment to certain carried interest arrangements not covered by
the prior administrative rule.
34. While it might seem "illogical" to construe the Service's administrative guidance
narrowly not to permit bifurcation, adopting "the rational, taxpayer-friendly, more expansive
reading" would represent a significant change in the status quo. LEVIN, supra note 27,
1006 at 10-19.
35. See Campbell v. Comm'r. 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding value of profits
interest was too speculative). In 2001, the Service adopted a surprisingly pro-taxpayer
position by extending the favorable liquidation-value rule even if a profits interest is
substantially nonvested at grant and no § 83(b) election is made. See Rev. Proc. 2001-43.
2001-2 C.B. 191 (deemed § 83(b) election).
36. Under § 83 principles, the service partner could be taxed on the fair market value
of the profits interest upon receipt. Because of valuation difficulties, however, the front-end
approach of taxing GP upon receipt of the interest is not a realistic alternative. See H.R.
REP. No. 110-728 at 17 (2008) (§ 710 "takes a different approach"). Under current law, GP
has no back-end ordinary income upon vesting of the interest, assuming a taxpayer-favorable
resolution of the liquidation-value issue under the Service's administrative guidance. See
LEVIN, supra note 27, 1006 at 10-20.
37. See Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1078, 1115-16 ("The true tax advantage [of a
carried interest] over other arrangements is the ability to swap tax character with partners
who are differently taxed."). Unless GP is taxed differently from LP, there is no tax
10 [Vol. 1: 1
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Jointly, LP and GP improve their economic situation solely at the expense
of the government. Since a profits interest does not actually convert capital
gain into ordinary income but rather merely reallocates capital gain among
the partners, the arrangement may appear technically to be outside the
elaborate § 704(b) regulations governing when partnership allocations will
be respected. This type of joint-tax arbitrage would, however, clearly
violate the § 704(b) regulations if it involved an actual swap of equal
amounts of ordinary income and capital gain.38 The § 704(b) tax-avoidance
test is merely a subset of the general § 701 anti-abuse rule, which permits
the Service to treat a partnership as an aggregate (rather than an entity) to
properly reflect income.3 9 Indeed, § 707(a)(2)(A) addresses the problem of
compensatory allocations and distributions intended to circumvent other
limitations-including the capitalization requirement and conversion of
-40ordinary income into lower-taxed income.
Despite this array of anti-abuse rules aimed at joint-tax arbitrage,
the carried interest debate has been popularly framed mainly in terms of the
one-sided advantage to GP who defers tax and converts ordinary income
into capital gain.41 Other commentators have perceived that the tax
advantage of profits interests involves essentially reallocation of capital
gain among taxable and tax-exempt (or tax-indifferent) partners, but have
nevertheless failed to recognize that such joint-tax minimization offends
advantage to the carried interest. See id. at 1114 (noting that it is "not a difference in tax
rates per se, but a 'difference in differences.' that matters).
38. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) (overall tax-effect rule). 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iii)(b) (as amended in 2008) (character allocations that shift tax consequences) see
also I.R.C. § 751 (2009) (prohibiting shifting of ordinary income and capital gains).
Because the swap is merely a putative swap-the prohibited shifting of tax consequences is
embedded in the structure of the transaction rather than P's formal allocation provisions-
the assumption is that § 704(b) is not violated.
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995): Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 n.4
(Statement of Charles I. Kingson. July 31. 2007) ("If the partnership anti-abuse rule has any
bite, use of a partnership to claim capital gain from performing services should have been
high on the list. But conflicts apparently prevented even bar associations from raising
this.").
40. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A) may be understood narrowly to avoid reaching private equity
managers' compensation. See Weisbach, supra note 14, at 731-32 (explaining that §
707(a)(2)(A) applies only to distributions not subject to substantial entrepreneurial risk); see
also Gergen, supra note 3, at 77 ("The line [§ 707(a)(2)(A)] draws relates poorly to the real
policy concern, and the line is poorly drawn."). Cf American Law Institute, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER K, PROPOSALS ON THE TAXATION OF PARTNERS 155-64
(1984).
41. See Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1077 n.14 (noting that the joint-tax perspective "is
oddly neglected in the treatment of private equity profits interests"); Knoll, supra note 6, at
126-27 (noting that "the tax consequences ... should be evaluated globally, for all parties to
a transaction, not just for one party in isolation.").
11
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW
fundamental principles of partnership taxation.42  Because the reform
debate largely overlooked existing partnership anti-abuse rules, Congress
may have failed to fully appreciate alternative solutions.
B. Economic Risk ofLoss and Deemed Taxes
In the carried interest debate, the fundamental issue is whether GP
should be respected as a partner even though his interest is in all respects
essentially identical to that of an option holder. As a putative profits
holder, GP has a right to share in future appreciation if P increases in value
above $40 million but bears no risk of loss except for the contingent
obligation to restore "excess" distributions.43  If P initially realizes
investment gains and subsequently incurs investment losses, the early
distributions to GP may exceed 20% of P's aggregate gains over P's life
cycle, triggering the clawback provision. The function of the clawback
provision is to align the parties' respective economic interests, particularly
given GP's control over the timing of gain recognition, and to achieve
cumulative aggregation of gains.
Example (2)-Unearned Carry. The facts are the same as in
Example (1), except that P sells D for only $5 million, triggering a $5
million loss ($5 million less $10 million basis). Overall, Pjust breaks even
(ignoring the time value of money); since P has no cumulative profits, GP's
entire $1 million of distributions should apparently be clawed back.4 4 In
reality, GP's clawback is often limited to after-tax distributions. Typically,
GP takes the position that the clawback obligation should be reduced by
reference to a hypothetical tax rate, often determined by reference to the
highest tax rate applicable to the income earned. Assume that P employs a
"net-of-tax" formula that reduces the clawback by reference to an assumed
marginal rate of 25%.45 In this event, GP must return the lesser of (1)
42. Indeed, one commentator concluded just the opposite: namely, that the partnership
rules give carte blanche to partners to reallocate income to minimize taxes and to avoid other
restrictions. See Viard, supra note 16, at 459 ("The reallocation is an application of
economy-wide partnership tax rules.").
43. More precisely, losses are allocated in the same manner as prior allocations of
profits until such losses have offset all previously allocated profits; any additional losses are
allocated 100% to contributed capital.
44. If GP restored $1 million to P, LP would receive $6 million on liquidation ($5
million from sale of D and $1 million from GP's contribution). Cumulatively, LP would
receive $40 million and GP would receive zero.
45. See Needham & Adams, supra note 27, at A-10 to A-ll; Paul H. Asofsky &
Andrew W. Needham, U.S. Private Equity Funds: Common Tax Issues For Investors and
Other Participants, 630 PLI/TAX 1275, 1308 (2004) ("Most fund clawback provisions net
the maximum clawback against taxes attributable to the carried interest allocations. How
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excess carry distributions ($1 million) or (2) the aggregate after-tax
distributions received by GP ($1 million less 0.25 x $1 million). In GP's
view, it would be unfair to require return of more than $0.75 million, since
GP should not be required to give up more than he actually retained after
tax.46 In effect, LP pays GP's hypothetical taxes by foregoing full return of
LP's committed capital. If the hypothetical tax rate exceeds GP's effective
marginal tax rate, the net result is that GP earns a positive return even
though LP's return is negative.
On sale of D, GP is allocated loss up to the amount of the clawback
obligation ($0.75 million); on liquidation, GP repays the unearned carry
(net of taxes) by restoring the $0.75 million deficit in his capital account
(rather than the full $1 million distribution). To create the proper deficit
47balance for GP, P simply "backs into" the desired amount. Under a
target-allocation approach, the partnership's allocations are determined
after gains and losses are realized, taking into account the partnership's
distribution "waterfall." Technically, target or "forced" allocations do not
comply with the capital account requirements of the § 704(b) regulations,
since distributions govern capital accounts (rather than the reverse). 4 8
While target allocations flunk the § 704(b) safe harbor rules, they may (or
may not) satisfy the alternate "partner's interest" test.49  If P disregards
capital account balances on liquidation, however, the validity of the prior
allocations should be subject to challenge.
If GP's clawback obligation is reduced by deemed taxes paid, it
might appear that it should also be increased by reference to any offsetting
tax benefits received by GP. Typically, however, the clawback provision
ignores the tax benefit to GP from the capital loss generated by the
clawback itself.50 Since GP derives a tax benefit only if GP has unrelated
funds compute this offset, however, varies widely in the industry."). The hypothetical tax
rate is intended to achieve "rough justice" among all of the partners, without looking to any
partner's particular tax circumstances. For example, if GP has unrelated losses that offset
GP's income from P, GP's effective tax rate will be lower than the deemed tax rate.
46. In this event, LP recovers only $39.75 million (rather than $40 million). The
missing $0.25 million is the amount of taxes (at the hypothetical tax rate) paid on the $1
million of net gain allocated to GP (prior to sale of D).
47. Under a target allocation approach, items of income and loss are allocated in a
manner that should cause GP's capital account to equal the amount that GP would receive
(or be required to contribute) on liquidation. See Needham & Adams, supra note 27, at A-
16 (noting that target allocation "plugs" the required change in capital account balances over
the relevant period).
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) (as amended in 2008). The regulations warn
that invalid allocations may give rise to appropriate tax consequences under §§ 61 and 83.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(iv) (as amended in 2008).
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2008).
50. See Needham & Adams, supra note 27, at A-10. While the potential tax
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capital gains to offset the capital loss on liquidation, the clawback provision
arbitrarily treats GP's tax benefit as zero. If GP can fully utilize the capital
loss, GP receives a windfall at the expense of LP. Because measuring GP's
actual tax benefit is administratively difficult or because GP has superior
bargaining power, LP may be willing to accept the risk of such a windfall.
To summarize, LP bears the entire economic risk of loss if P fails to
earn a positive return on LP's invested capital over the life of the
partnership. Even though GP initially receives a distribution of $1 million
in Year 2, GP is obligated in Example (2) to return only the net after-tax
distribution (without interest) in Year 5. Under the terms of the partners'
arrangement, the actual burden of the taxes paid on GP's share of
partnership gain falls on LP, not GP. Consistent with the underlying
economics, LP furnishes the partnership's entire capital and effectively
bears the tax burden attributable to gain allocated to GP to the extent that
GP fails to earn carry. There is a strong argument that GP should not be
respected as a partner if, in a worst-case scenario, LP effectively bears the
burden of taxes nominally imposed on GP and the underlying arrangement
is intended merely to reduce the parties' joint-tax liability.52 Allocating $1
million of gain to GP in Year 2 allows GP to swap ordinary compensation
income for capital gain, even though repayment of the net after-tax
distribution leaves GP no worse off than if the entire gain were allocated to
LP.
C. Timing ofDistributions and Disguised Loans
The partnership's allocation provisions determine how gain or loss
is shared among the partners when realized by the partnership. By contrast,
the distribution provisions determine when partners will actually receive
cash from the partnership. If income has previously been taxed to a partner,
the corresponding distributions are generally tax free.53 Depending on the
consequences vary, the funding of the clawback obligation will generally result in a short-
term capital loss to GP; non-corporate taxpayers are not permitted to carry back capital
losses in order to offset capital gains in prior years. See I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 172(d) (2009).
51. See Needham & Adams, supra note 27, at A-10. To mitigate the likelihood of a
clawback arising. P may choose to "write down" any unrealized losses in assets not yet sold
and treat such losses as if actually incurred.
52. If LP bears the burden of the taxes nominally imposed on GP's allocable share of
profits. GP's willingness to be taxed on such implicit salary is not economically meaningful.
While the assumption that no carry is earned may seem counterintuitive if investors expect
assets to be sold for an amount in excess of their carrying cost, the § 704(b) capital-account
analysis nevertheless tests the validity of allocations based on a hypothetical worst case. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
53. See I.R.C. § 731 (2009).
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substance of the parties' economic arrangement, however, a purported
distribution may represent a disguised payment for services or an implicit
loan and be taxed accordingly.54
From GP's perspective, the timing of distributions is apparently
paramount. GP is likely to resist strenuously the notion of deferring
distributions until all of P's assets are sold and P is wound up. Since the
clawback obligation is unsecured, however, LP risks that GP will lack
sufficient funds to restore excess carried interest distributions. This credit
risk could be solved by requiring escrow of all or a portion of GP's
distributions until LP has received a return of all prior contributions.
Nevertheless, private equity funds rarely follow this approach, perhaps
based on the implicit assumption that "unrealized investments will generate
proceeds at least equal to their carrying value."56  Like the provision
concerning deemed taxes paid, the distribution methodology is a function of
the parties' relative bargaining power. As an economic matter, GP's
preference for early distributions may nevertheless be somewhat puzzling.
In theory, the timing of distributions should be irrelevant, since adjustments
to the terms of the parties' arrangement are possible to reflect the present
value of accelerated or deferred distributions." Indeed, GP should be able
to borrow against his share of undistributed profits to replicate the cash-
flow consequences of accelerated distributions.58
While often overlooked in the carried interest debate, the choice of
distribution rules may significantly enhance GP's overall compensation.
GP effectively borrows at no interest from LP in exchange for a contingent
recourse liability to repay unearned distributions upon liquidation. The §
704(b) capital account rules do not identify implicit loans among partners
or require interest to be charged on deficit restoration obligations; nor does
GP's interest-free borrowing fall within the rules of § 7872 for below-
interest loans. 59 The valuable no-interest loan embedded in the opaque and
manipulable distribution rules may help to reinforce GP's preference for
54. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 707 (2009).
55. SCHELL, supra note 28, at 2-27 (noting that the escrow approach "is strongly
resisted"); see also Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements:
Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76 U. CHIL. L. REV. 161, 177 (2009) (describing
the escrow approach as least favorable from GP's perspective, since GP "has, in effect, made
an interest-free loan to investors"). Of course, GP could be credited with interest on the
escrowed amounts. See Asofsky & Needham, supra note 45, at 1310.
56. SCHELL. supra note 28. at 2-21.
57. See Litvak, supra note 55, at 176.
58. Cf id. (noting sponsors' claim that "borrowing from outside lenders against future
income [would be] prohibitively expensive").
59. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c) (as amended in 2008). Cf I.R.C. § 7872
(2009) (governing interest-free loans generally between employees and employers).
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60
early distributions. By using a profits interest (rather than an
economically equivalent option), GP gains access to implicit interest-free
loans as well as the opportunity to convert ordinary income into capital
gain; thus, the tax advantage alone may be only a partial explanation of
GP's desire for a carried interest arrangement. Since drafting the intricate
distribution provisions is preeminently the task of tax lawyers, even
sophisticated parties may not fully comprehend the economic import of
these ordering rules.61
If P held back carried interest distributions, it would nevertheless
provide for tax distributions to GP sufficient to pay GP's deemed taxes on
allocated income. To eliminate the possibility that a service partner will
incur tax liability in excess of distributions for a particular period, the
nearly universal practice is to require priority tax distributions to address
timing problems.62  The business justification for mandatory tax
distributions is that taxes on the firm's entire income must be paid before
determining any economic profit. If the enterprise were operated in
corporate form, the tax would be incurred at the corporate level, effectively
burdening the return to the preferred interest. Similarly, LP should be
entitled to its preference (return of capital and any hurdle rate) only after
setting aside cash sufficient to pay taxes on the firm's income. Given the
parties' interest in maximizing joint after-tax returns, the nominal tax
burden should be allocated in whatever manner minimizes the partners'
joint-tax liability64
Under existing § 707(a)(2)(A), Congress delegated authority to
Treasury to distinguish disguised payments from true distributive shares.65
Under that provision, a purported allocation and distribution may be
recharacterized as a nonpartner payment. If GP were treated as a
nonpartner, P's entire income would be reallocated to LP and LP would be
deemed to transfer $1 million to GP in Year 2 as compensation or a
60. See Litvak, supra note 55, at 163 ("[T]he interest-free loan is both opaque and
highly valuable.").
61. See id. at 196 (referring to distribution rules as possible evidence of "contractual
complexity . . . used to increase stealth compensation").
62. See SCHELL. supra note 28. at 2-23 (noting that "acceptance of this minimal
distribution is all but universal").
63. While the partnership model eliminates an entity-level tax, mandatory tax
distributions mimic the result under the corporate model. See Robert P. Rothman.
Translating Corporate Concepts into the Language of LLCs, 61 TAx LAW. 161, 174-76
(2007). The tax distribution provision is less important if GP receives current distributions,
but it nevertheless affects the clawback calculation.
64. See Sanchirico, supra note 5. at 1143 (noting that the nominal incidence does not
affect "real tax burdens, given the adjustability of wages and salaries").
65. For the origins of § 707(a)(2)(A), see Karen C. Burke. Back to the Future:
Revisiting the ALI's Carried Interest Proposals, 124 TAx NOTES 242, 243-44 (2009).
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disguised interest-free loan. In Example (1), if the purported distribution
were treated as a loan (leaving aside possible imputed interest under §
7872), GP would be taxed on ordinary income of $1 million upon
liquidation of P, since GP's obligation to repay the loan is eliminated; the
result would be the same as if GP were treated as holding an option
exercisable immediately prior to liquidation of P.66 Nonpartner treatment
under § 707(a)(2)(A) would thus eliminate GP's ability to convert salary
into capital gain but would potentially permit longer deferral, by analogy to
an option exercised upon liquidation of the partnership.
D. Earned Capital
In the baseline case of a self-liquidating private equity partnership,
taxing distributions and taxing distributive shares may seem to be a
distinction without a difference. Thus, it is perhaps easy to understand how
the recharacterization approach-treating a profits allocation as ordinary
income-popularly came to be confused with taxing distributions, not
distributive shares. If earnings are never accumulated for later distribution,
the service partner does not acquire any "earned capital." In the context of
a private equity fund, the problem of earned capital-income taxed to a
service partner as ordinary income and reinvested in the enterprise-simply
does not arise because all profits are distributed currently. Since many
partnerships routinely reinvest earnings, however, complex adjustments are
necessary when distributions are deferred.6 If earnings from services are
reinvested in the enterprise, some mechanism is needed to track separately
the labor and capital components of a service partner's future return.
Indeed, the partnership tax bar has seized the opportunity to "improve"
reform by meticulously working out the logical consequences of an earned
capital exception, injecting further complexity and electivity.
The notion of earned capital, however, assumes that a service
partner who has a forfeitable interest should nevertheless be recognized as a
partner. Treating such a service provider as a partner is contrary to the
66. In Example (2), reallocating partnership income entirely to LP would eliminate the
$0.25 million of tax, since the investment return would be taxed at LP's zero rate; if LP
loaned the full $1 million interest-free to GP. GP would repay the entire amount (rather than
only $0.75 million) on liquidation.
67. See NYSBA Report. supra note 11. at 28 (noting that, unlike private equity funds,
"other funds, in particular hedge funds and many real estate funds, routinely reinvest
previously-taxed earnings in new portfolio investments." In response to the bar's comments,
the current proposal carves out an exception for investment returns to earned capital; simply
put, such investment returns are subtracted from GP's profits share and taxed as capital gain.
See infra notes 132-154 and accompanying text.
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normal rules of § 83, the general provision governing receipt of property in
connection with services. In light of the potential conflict between § 83
and the partnership rules, the partnership tax bar has long sought a special
rule that would exempt a profits holder whose interest is forfeitable from
the normal operation of § 83. From the partnership tax bar's perspective,
the ordinary income approach favored by reformers is nothing new.
Historically, the ordinary income approach harkens back to proposals by
William McKee and others in the 1970's as a compromise solution to the
potential conflict between § 83 and the partnership rules.69
While reformers perhaps unwittingly borrowed the ordinary income
approach as a solution to the carried interest problem, the McKee proposal
antedated the modern capital account system. The complex capital account
system makes it possible, in theory, to track the separate labor and capital
components of a service partner's interest when earnings from services are
reinvested in the partnership. Indeed, it may be possible to refine the
McKee proposal to take into account previously taxed and reinvested salary
as a source of future capital gains, by "disaggregating" a service partner's
return into separate labor and capital components. Yet capital accounts
may be a shaky foundation for reform, and the earned capital exception
may be a misnomer. When GP has solely a profits interest contingent on a
performance goal, the fundamental issue is whether GP or LP should be
treated as owning partnership capital that generates an investment return
taxed as capital gain. If, upon closer inspection, § 710 is not the simple
solution touted by reformers, a better approach may be to deny partner
status to a service provider who is essentially in the same position as an
option holder.
68. Section 83 requires a person who receives property in connection with performance
of services to include the value of such property in income when such property first becomes
"transferable" or is no longer subject to a "substantial risk of forfeiture." See I.R.C. §
83(a)(1) (2009). In the absence of a § 83(b) election, the taxable event occurs when the
transferred property becomes substantially vested. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (as amended
in 2005). Prior to vesting, the transferor (not the transferee) is treated as the owner of such
property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2003).
69. See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
70. See Senate Hearings. supra note 1 (Statement of Charles 1. Kingson, July 31, 2007)
("The debate over carried interests should be seen as part of a derivative free-for-all, a sort
of financial check-the-box regime. in which people can choose between the tax attributes of
owning or not owning property."). Kingson was apparently the only witness who suggested
that an investment manager's return should already be taxed as ordinary income under
current law. Id. See also Charles I. Kingson, Carried Interests: An Outdated Term?, 123
TAX NOTEs 627 (2009) ("A bill to tax hedge fund managers on their share of the profits as
ordinary income probably loses revenue . . . [A] statute ratifies their previous position.")
[hereinafter Kingson, Carried Interests: An Outdated Term?].
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II. PROPOSED §§ 710 AND 83
Although hardly novel, the recharacterization approach of § 710
follows broadly the proposal of reformers who argued that a service
partner's distributive share should be treated as ordinary income from
compensation. Rather than address joint-tax minimization by reallocating
income between service providers and investors, the recharacterization
approach affects the treatment of only one party to the transaction. Such an
approach is theoretically flawed but arguably represents an appealing
political compromise: it preserves the status of a service provider as a
partner, suspends the taxable event until profits are allocated to the service
provider, and treats investor partners no less favorably than under current
law. Consistent with the "technical" recommendations of the partnership
tax bar, the Levin bill amends § 83 to provide a statutory exception for
profits interests (the zero-value approach), offering an unwarranted
valuation subsidy for valuable profits interests. Section 710 would be both
complex and easily avoidable: tax-exempt investors and service providers
would have a joint-tax incentive to opt out of § 710 by restructuring a
profits interest as an economically equivalent option to achieve yield
exemption and longer deferral.
A. Ordinary Income Treatment
In the reductionist version of the story told to Congress, the
undertaxation of GP-who earns compensation for services but is taxed at
the capital gains rate-creates a fundamental problem of distributive
justice72 Such undertaxation is attributable to a "quirk" of partnership tax
law that treats receipt of a profits interest as nontaxable, thereby allowing
deferral and conversion. Rather than challenge the partner status of a
service provider who holds an option-like interest, reformers focused
narrowly on the characterization rule of § 702(b). Under that rule, the
character of income in the hands of the partnership determines the character
71. See NYSBA Report, supra note 11, at 14.
72. See House Hearing, supra note 1 (Statement of Victor Fleischer. Sept. 6. 2007, at
4) (to some. "the most compelling point is simply one of distributive justice."). While the
proposed legislation might offer fresh opportunities for gamesmanship, such challenges were
viewed as surmountable. Id. at 7 ("[T]hese details can be ironed out, and we should not let
the private equity industry's threat of further gamesmanship justify inequities and
inefficiencies in the current law.").
73. Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5 (describing the "quirk in the partnership tax rules [that]
allows some of the richest workers in the country to pay tax on their labor income at a low
effective rate").
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of the income in the hands of the partner. Indeed, such "conduit" treatment
has long been perceived to be at the heart of the partnership tax rules.74
Faulting the conduit rule as the source of capital-gain conversion, reformers
proposed a simple solution to redress a serious inequity: recharacterize
income passed through to GP as ordinary income. Consistent with this
solution, § 710 overrides the long-standing character flow-through rule
under § 702 and treats disproportionate allocations to GP as ordinary
income (or loss).76 Simply stated, the net effect is to increase the tax rate on
GP's implicit salary from 15% to 35%, without altering the tax
consequences to LP. The tradeoff for increasing the tax rate on GP is
preserving intact the existing favorable treatment of LP.
Proposed § 710 exempts from ordinary income treatment an
allocation that reflects a reasonable return on a service partner's "qualified
capital interest."79  Qualified capital consists initially of the amount of
money, the fair market value of any property contributed to the partnership,
and the amount (if any) taxed to the service partner upon receipt of a profits
interest.80 Upward (or downward) adjustments must be made to a service
partner's share of qualified capital to reflect net income (or net loss) as well
74. See GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN C. BURKE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 47 (2009) (noting
that courts refer to § 702(b) as the "conduit rule").
75. See Fleischer, supra note 2. at 51 (referring to "Ordinary-Income Method"); Senate
Hearings. supra note 1 (Statement of Mark P. Gergen. July 11, 2007) ("There is a fairly
simple solution to the problem of the taxation of carried interests . ... The capital accounts
system . . . makes this fairly easy to do."); id ("The capital account makes it possible to
identify when a distributive share is compensation.").
76. Compare I.R.C. § 702(b) (2009) (character of any item included in partners
distributive share "shall be treated as if such item were realized directly from the source
from which realized by the partnership") with Prop. § 710(a)(1) ("Notwithstanding section
702(b)," any net income or loss "shall be treated as ordinary income [or] ordinary loss.").
77. Assuming that most LPs are tax exempt, the one-sided change in the tax treatment
of GP would result in a net increase in revenue. See Knoll, supra note 6, at 129 (noting that
untaxed investors provide at least 50% of private equity capital). Carried interest allocations
recharacterized as ordinary income would also be subject to Social Security and Medicare
taxes as self-employment income. See Prop. § 710(a)(1)(A); I.R.C. § 1402 (2009).
78. See Schler, supra note 13, at 839 (noting that Prop. § 710 approach "is theoretically
incorrect, but on balance it is a reasonable and generally pro-taxpayer result").
79. See Prop. § 710(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (allocations must be made "in the same manner" as
allocations made to non-service partners that are "significant" in comparison to allocations
made to service partners): Prop. § 710(c)(2)(C) (defining a qualified capital interest). See
also NYSBA Report, supra note 11. at 20 24 (describing the "reasonable allocation"
requirement under prior versions of the carried interest legislation).
80. See Prop. § 710(c)(2)(C) (2009). A service partner's qualified capital will initially
be zero (the liquidation value of the profits interest), unless the partner owns a separate
capital interest. See Prop. § 710(c)(2)(C)(ii) (treating as qualified capital the amount of
income included under proposed § 83 upon grant).
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as distributions of cash and property.' If all earnings are distributed
currently, GP never acquires qualified capital from retained earnings
("earned capital"), and § 710 has the same net result as taxing all
distributions to GP as ordinary income. In all other situations, the operation
of § 710 is much more complex.
Since GP is treated as receiving compensation, it might appear
logical to tax P's income entirely to LP, with an offsetting compensation
deduction. 82 Section 710 does not follow that logical approach: it alters the
character of the income allocated to GP but does not reallocate income
between GP and LP. Since LP is taxed on only 80% of the partnership
income, LP receives the equivalent of a deduction in the form of a reduced
84
share of capital gain. If LP is tax exempt, LP is indifferent to the loss of a
worthless deduction. If LP is a taxable individual and the expense is
immediately deductible, § 710 is potentially punitive. The net detriment to
LP is equal to the difference between the ordinary income rate and the
capital gain rate on the implicit salary. Section 710 essentially provides an
election to obtain a deduction for GP's implicit salary. To take advantage
of this election, the parties must simply pay cash (rather than carry) to GP.
This elective workaround exposes a fundamental flaw: under § 710, it is
not possible to ensure consistent treatment of the parties regardless of
whether cash or carry is used.85
81. Any net income is generally treated as ordinary income attributable to services; any
net loss is generally treated as ordinary loss to the extent of amounts previously taxed as
ordinary income. See Prop. § 710(a)(1)(A) and (B); see also Prop. § 710(c)(2)(C)(iii)(II)
(2009) (reduction for net losses and distributions). The loss limitation would be layered on
top of existing loss limitation rules. See I.R.C. §§ 704(d), 465, 469, and 470 (2009).
82. When § 707(a)(2)(A) applies, the defective allocation is disregarded and the related
items of income (or loss) are reallocated to the other partners, who may also be entitled to a
current (or capitalized) deduction for compensation. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N. 98TH
CONG. 2D SESS.. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 227 28 (Comm. Print 1984); S. PRT. No. 98-169, at 227 29
(1984); H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1218-20 (1984) (Conf. Rep.). It is not clear how Prop. §
710 would be coordinated with § 707(a)(2)(A).
83. See Schler, supra note 13, at 838-39 (contrasting the recharacterization/exclusion
approach with the inclusion/deduction approach). Under current law, taxable individual
investors' share of capital gain is partially offset by capital gain shifted to the service partner
as compensation for investment services. See Knoll. supra note 6, at 157-58 (noting that
investors are taxed like any other investor in a capital asset).
84. Denial of a deduction to the investors may be justified on the ground that it "avoids
the situation in which individual investors get the tax benefit of concurrent capital gain
income and an ordinary deduction." Gergen, supra note 12, at 149 n.2. See also Knoll,
supra note 6, at 157 (allowing an ordinary deduction would potentially convert "private
equity limited partnership interests [into] tax-advantaged assets").
85. While the option of paying cash to GP offers "a cheap and easy design around" the
proposed legislation. there are no practicable alternatives to prevent such self-help measures.
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It is useful to compare the recharacterization approach of § 710
with the entity approach of § 707(a)(2)(A) which would treat the
partnership as paying compensation to GP as a third-party service provider.
Under the inclusion/deduction approach of § 707(a)(2)(A), LP would
include P's entire income and would deduct (or capitalize) the implicit
salary. When GP's implicit salary is capitalized, taxing LP on only 80%
of overall gain achieves roughly the same result as under § 707(a)(2)(A).8
Under the § 707(a)(2)(A) approach, LP would be forced to include all of
P's income with a potential offsetting deduction. By contrast, the § 710
approach omits the final step of forcing LP to deduct or capitalize the
expense. If the implicit salary would be a disallowed expense, the
recharacterization/exclusion approach of § 710 treats LP too generously by
giving LP the equivalent of a deduction." The net result is that § 710 will
often result in unwarranted bonuses or penalties, subject to transactional
elections to vary the results to minimize the parties' joint taxes.
When LP is tax exempt (or otherwise tax indifferent), § 710
eliminates the joint-tax windfall resulting from conversion of ordinary
income into capital gain. 89 Under current law, both GP and taxable
individual LPs have an incentive to structure compensation as carry rather
than as a fee to avoid the § 212 limitation on the deductibility of
investment-type expenses.90  If expenses passed through to individual
taxable investors are properly treated as § 212 expenses, they may result in
Gergen. supra note 12. at 140: ef id. (suggesting treating compensation contingent on profits
"as an allocation of those profits however the payment is formally characterized").
86. Both § 707(a) payments and § 707(c) payments are subject to the capitalization
requirement of § 263. If the partnership is required to capitalize a salary payment (or the
deduction is disallowed), § 707(a)(2)(A) prevents conversion of long-term capital gain into
ordinary income. For example. assume that P has $100 of long-term capital gain, of which
$20 is taxed to GP. If the $20 of implicit salary is capitalized, P's deduction is eliminated.
leaving LP with $80 of long-term capital gain ($100 less $20 basis offset) and GP with $20
of ordinary income.
87. See Knoll, supra note 6, at 128 n.78 (discussing uncertainty under current law
concerning whether investment fees (paid in cash upfront) would be deductible immediately
or capitalized and amortized over time); Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1076 n.13 (assuming
fees would be immediately deductible); Weisbach, supra note 14, at 732 (concluding that
payments "would not likely have to be capitalized").
88. Cf Sanchirico, supra note 5. at 1127 (noting that permanent disallowance is
unlikely, since the partnership's business can be restructured to ensure that "the limited
partner is able at some point to deduct at least some portion of his distributive share" of the
imputed salary expense) (emphasis added).
89. Since corporate partners do not benefit from lower capital gains rates, they are
generally indifferent between an ordinary income deduction and reduced capital gain. See
Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1124-25; Knoll, supra note 6, at 130.
90. See I.R.C. § 212 (2009) (treating investment expenses of individual taxpayers as
additional itemized deductions).
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a worthless itemized deduction.9' By allowing a deduction-equivalent to
LP, § 710 attempts to "finesse" the § 212 issue.92 While overly generous,
this approach could be viewed as "simplifying" the treatment of taxable
individual investors by not forcing them to include an additional amount in
income (their portion of GP's implicit salary) and then claim an offsetting
deduction. Although some commentators have suggested that the § 212
limitation may be difficult to defend as a matter of tax policy, taxable
individual investors should not be allowed an undeserved windfall. 93 Even
if the partnership claims to be conducting an active trade or business,
investment-type expenses attributable to a limited partnership interest, by
analogy to a security, should arguably be treated as § 212 expenses.
B. Joint-Tax Perspective and § 83
Although some reformers claim that the existing treatment of
partnership profits interests is fundamentally untenable as a policy matter,
this issue may be a "red herring." 94 The tax treatment of profits interests
appears anomalous mainly if one focuses narrowly on GP's one-sided
conversion and deferral. From a joint-tax perspective, the existing
91. See I.R.C. §§ 67, 68, and 56(b) (2009). If the partnership qualifies as a "trader"
rather than an "investor," § 162 may apply to management expenses passed through to
investors. Cf Rev. Rul. 2008-39. 2008-2 C.B. 252 (management fees paid by upper-tier
partnership were not § 162 expenses fees passed through to investors as separately-stated §
212 expenses). Even if the partnership is a trader, the § 469 passive loss limitations may
apply to an individual investor. See I.R.C. § 469 (2009).
92. Gergen, supra note 12, at 140 ("Code Sec. 710 tries to finesse this issue."). Since
"many of the funds targeted by the [legislation] do not engage in a 'trade or business' at all,"
the proposed legislation is clearly overly generous to investors. NYSBA Report. supra note
11. at 69 n.184.
93. Cf Sanchirico. supra note 5, at 1105 (suggesting that avoidance of the § 212 limits
may be "quite different normatively" since the disfavored treatment of investment expenses
"is not itself easy to justify as a policy matter"). While managers' outsized salaries may be
an especially attractive target for reform, the case for preserving taxable individual
investors' current favorable treatment needs to be made explicitly, not as a backhanded
criticism of § 212. See Susan Kalinka, Rev. Rul. 2008-38 and Rev. Rul. 2008-39: Above the
Line, Below the Line and Even Further Below the Line, 87 TAXES 23 (2009) (proposing to
treat all passive investors the same whether they invest in securities directly or through a
hedge fund): Andrew W. Needham & Christian Brause. 736 B.N.A. TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO
A-59 to A-63 (2007) (discussing uncertainties concerning a hedge fund's "trader" status).
94. Sanchirico. supra note 5. at 1082 (describing flawed tax treatment of profits
interests as "something of a red herring"). Whatever its defects, current law is clearly rooted
in considerations of administrability, not an intent to "subsidize activity carried out in the
partnership form." Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARv L. REV. 874, 913
(2003).
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treatment of partnership profits interests generally does not give rise to a tax
advantage (or disadvantage) if all parties are taxed at the same rates on
ordinary income and capital gains. It is important to consider the tax
treatment of partnership profits interest within the broader spectrum of
alternative compensation arrangements. The differing tax treatments of
these alternative compensation forms can be illustrated graphically as
follows:
GP's Profits Share
GP LP
Profits interest CG (realization) no deduction
(current law)
Option 01 (exercise) CG (realization)
ordinary deduction (exercise)
§ 710 01 (realization) no deduction
CG (realization) ,_I§ 707(a)(2)(A) 01 (distribution) CG (reallocation)
ordinary deduction (payment)
From a joint-tax perspective, profits interests and options are
generally not tax advantaged when LP and GP are taxed at the same rates.
In the case of a profits interest, the tax benefit to GP, who reports capital
gain rather than ordinary income as partnership profits are realized and
allocated, is precisely offset by the tax detriment to LP, who reports less
capital gain but loses an ordinary deduction. 95 From a joint-tax perspective,
a compensatory partnership option is not globally tax advantaged because
GP's entire compensatory return is taxed as ordinary income, offset by a
deduction to LP, and the partnership's entire investment return is taxed to
LP. Similarly, under the Service's administrative guidance for valuing a
profits interest upon receipt, there may be no joint-tax advantage if both LP
and GP are taxed at the same rates.96 If LP is tax exempt (or otherwise tax
95. See Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1076, 1082 (concluding that the tax advantage
enjoyed by private equity fund managers "is most fundamentally a form of 'joint-tax
arbitrage"' rather than "a matter of wholesale conversion and deferral"): Knoll. supra note 6.
at 128: Weisbach. supra note 14, at 732 33 ("[T]he only real difference between use of an
explicit salary and the use of a carried interest relates to having tax-exempt investors.").
96. One commentator has recently faulted reformers for failing to identify the § 83(b)
election as a source of inequity in the taxation of equity-based deferred compensation. See
Philip F. Postlewaite, Fifteen and Thirty Five - Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the
Internal Revenue Code: The Taxation of Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a Proprietary
Interest in a Business Enterprise, 122 TAX NOTES 503, 531 (2009). From a joint-tax
perspective, however, a § 83(b) election is likely to be tax advantageous only if the employer
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indifferent), however, the fundamental premise of safe harbor treatment is
flawed, since LP suffers no offsetting detriment in the form of a forgone
compensation deduction.97
As discussed below, the Service's liberal administrative guidance
on profits interests was arguably never intended to sanction the type of
capital-gain conversion that prompted reformers' ire. Rather, safe harbor
treatment should be limited to those situations in which there is little room
for abuse because sufficient tax tension exists between the partners.
Ironically, it was quite clear to sophisticated partnership practitioners,
though perhaps not to Congress, that private equity arrangements were not
literally protected under the Service's administrative guidance. On the one
hand, practitioners perhaps hoped and believed that regulations proposed in
2005 (and never finalized) would retroactively sanction the aggressive
position that receipt of such carried interests was tax free. On the other
hand, reformers demanded a statutory solution to a problem flowing from
overly generous administrative rules that never had the force of law. If the
problem was administrative in nature, however, the solution may well be
for Congress to direct Treasury to use existing regulatory and statutory
tools to address the underlying problem.
While generally following the Service's prior administrative
guidance, the 2005 proposed regulations impose formal conditions
concerning the taxation of profits interests more consistent with the general
structure of § 83.98 Under the proposed regulations, two elections must be
made to ensure partner status: an election to treat the value of the interest
(capital or profits) as equal to the amount the service provider would
receive on an immediate deemed liquidation of the partnership (the
liquidation-value election) and an election to include the value of a
nonvested interest in income (a § 83(b) election). 99  The proposed
regulations sanction nonrecognition of gain or loss at the partnership level
when a partnership transfers a compensatory partnership interest or
is effectively tax-exempt; in this situation, "the parties can generate a large tax benefit from
undervaluing the employer's shares and making the election." See Knoll, supra note 5, at
745.
97. While the lack of any offsetting tax detriment should be sufficient grounds to
exclude such arrangements from safe harbor treatment, current law may present a closer
issue. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n. Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax
Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues 54 (Sept. 4. 2007) (JCX 62-
07) (querying "whether it is appropriate to permit the general partner to have favorable tax
treatment premised on an offsetting tax disadvantage to limited partners when, by virtue of
the limited partners' tax status, no such disadvantage results.").
98. See REG-105-346-03, supra note 32, Preamble. Under the proposed 2005
regulations, the liquidation-value election is available only if services are performed for the
issuing partnership.
99. See id.
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option. 00 Under the so-called "circle-of-cash" theory, the partnership may
be deemed to transfer cash compensation to the service partner who then
recontributes the cash to the partnership in exchange for a capital interest.
The 2005 proposed regulations do not explicitly adopt the circle-of-cash
theory; without any analysis or discussion, the preamble states merely that
deferring partnership-level gain is "more consistent with the
[nonrecognition] policies underlying section 721" than would be a
recognition rule. 101
The 2005 proposed regulations were controversial because they
contradicted prior authority that was generally viewed as requiring non-
service partners to recognize gain on exchange of a partnership capital
interest for services.10 2 While the partnership tax bar has generally extolled
the nonrecognition result-by analogy to § 1032 when a corporation
transfers stock as compensation for services-such treatment is surprisingly
difficult to reconcile with the legislative history and statutory structure of
§ 721. Thus far, the carried interest legislation does not address the
controversial issue of partnership-level gain recognition when a service
-104partner receives a capital interest (or exercises a compensatory option).
Now that § 710 has implicitly reopened these issues, however, it seems
100. See Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(2), 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (May 24, 2005). If the
partnership revalues its assets in connection with the service partner's admission, built-in
gain or loss in the partnership's assets is preserved, under § 704(c) principles, for later
recognition by the non-service partners. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(iii) (as
amended in 2008): see also Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2008).
101. REG-105-346-03, supra note 32, Preamble.
102. Under the prevailing view prior to issuance of the proposed 2005 regulations,
transfer of a capital interest in exchange for services results in recognition of gain or loss at
the partnership level. See, e.g., YIN & BURKE, supra note 74, at 278. The partnership is
allowed a deduction (allocated to the non-service partners) equal to the amount included in
the service partner's income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)(1). (a)(4) (as amended in 2003)
(capitalization requirement).
103. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Recognition of Gain By a P'Shi Issuing an
Equity Interest, 109 TAx NOTES 1161 (2005) (arguing that nonrecognition treatment is
inconsistent with the legislative history of § 721); cf Douglas A. Kahn, The Proper
Treatment of the Transfer of a Compensatory Partnership Interest, 62 TAx LAW. 1, 51-56
(2009) (criticizing McMahon's view).
104. See Monte A. Jackel & Robert J. Crnkovich, Partnership Deferred Compensation
and Carried Interests, 123 TAX NOTES 351. 353 (2009). A prior version of Prop. § 710
required partnership-level gain recognition on a distribution of appreciated property to a
service partner. but the provision was revised to limit gain recognition solely to the service
partner. See Carol Kulish Harvey & Eric Lee, A Technical Walk Through the Carried
Interest Provisions Contained in Chairman Rangel's Tax Reform Proposal, 86 TAXES 77, 93
(2008) (discussing former version of Prop. § 710(b)(4)); NYSBA Report, supra note 11, at
31-32. As the partnership tax bar clearly perceived, partnership-level gain recognition under
Prop. § 710 would have been inconsistent with the proposed 2005 regulations which defer
the historic partners' gain recognition on transfer of a capital interest for services.
26 [Vol. 1: 1
2010] THE SOUND AND FURY OF CARRIED INTEREST REFORM
likely that the partnership tax bar may seek the opportunity to obtain a
statutory override to the gain recognition rule. If so, § 710 may become the
excuse for achieving yet another longstanding goal of the partnership tax
bar-namely, to create a special nonrecognition rule for partnerships when
property is transferred in exchange for services.
In response to comments from the partnership tax bar, the carried
interest bill would significantly amend § 83.105 The revision to § 83 is very
brief and essentially adds two special rules for partnership interests distinct
from all other types of property subject to § 83. First, except as provided
by regulations, the fair market value of a partnership interest issued for
services (whether a capital or profits interest) would be treated as equal to
the liquidation value of the interest (as determined under a hypothetical sale
at the time of grant). Second, the recipient of the interest would be deemed
to make a section 83(b) election unless the recipient specifically elected not
to have section 83(b) apply. The net effect of these changes is that the
recipient of a nonvested profits interest would obtain all of the benefits of
partner status at no tax cost, without even bothering to make a § 83(b)
election. Such largesse would no longer depend on dubious administrative
guidance but would instead be codified as an amendment to § 83.
Since a compensatory partnership interest is nearly always
structured as a profits interest (rather than a capital interest), the deemed §
83(b) election achieves a taxpayer-favorable result (zero value), subject to
an election out.106 In the unlikely event that the service partner receives a
capital interest, the liquidation-value rule prevents "whipsawing" of the
government: the recipient could not claim a lower discounted value based
on fair market value, while non-service partners claimed a deduction (or
capitalized expense) based on the higher liquidation value.'0  The proposed
rules are extraordinarily favorable to taxpayers who would nearly always
prefer to structure compensation as a nontaxable profits interest rather than
a taxable capital interest. Indeed, if there were any serious likelihood that a
compensatory interest would be structured as a capital interest, the
105. Proposed § 83(a)(4)(A) and (B) contained in Section 1 of the Levin Bill, supra note
1. See NYSBA Report, supra note 11, at 8 (recommending amendment of § 83 to permit or
require use of liquidation value).
106. In effect, the deemed election would free service partners and non-service partners
from the burden of making two elections: a liquidation-value election and a § 83(b) election.
See NYSBA Report, supra note 11, at 27 28 (suggesting "a clear statutory basis for
liquidation value" is necessary to allow partnerships to make the liquidation-value election
on behalf of partners "free of the procedural constraints of the currently-proposed safe
harbor").
107. While a profits interest has a liquidation value of zero by definition, the
liquidation-value of a capital interest may exceed its fair market value discounted to reflect
lack of marketability and other factors.
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partnership tax bar would presumably demand valuation discounts to reflect
lack of marketability and control.
Formally, receipt of a compensatory partnership profits interest
would continue to be subject to § 83. Nevertheless, the zero-value rule and
deemed § 83(b) election would effectively exempt partnership profits
interests from entanglement with § 83. Since 1969, much of the partnership
tax bar has strenuously resisted the notion that § 83 should apply in the
partnership area.108 As William McKee noted in 1977, the "potential
conflict between § 83 and Subchapter K is more than skin-deep . . . .
[T]reating a person as a partner prior to the lapse of a substantial risk
permits the § 83 scheme to be subverted and manipulated to the advantage
of a canny taxpayer."1 09 Indeed, McKee recommended a "compromise
solution" under which the normal partnership rules would "simply give way
to § 83, so that all income included in the distributive share of a partner
[whose interest is forfeitable] would be treated as compensation income,
regardless of its character as determined at the partnership level."' 0
Proposed § 710 is strikingly similar to McKee's compromise proposal, but
would often afford even more taxpayer-friendly treatment by
recharacterizing some (but not all) of a profits share as ordinary income.'
As a policy matter, the issue is whether profits interests should be
exempt from the normal rule of § 83 applicable to all other transfers of
property for services. The zero-value rule provides an unjustifiable
valuation subsidy to recipients of profits interests in comparison to other
types of non-partnership equity compensation.'"2 Since enactment of § 83,
Congress has codified the rules for taxing deferred compensation under §
409A, which applies in both the corporate and partnership contexts.!13 The
108. E.g.. WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL.. FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 5.08[3][a] at 5-44 to 5-45 (1977) (referring to § 83 as "inspired primarily by
dissatisfaction with prior law relating to transfers of corporate stock to employees" and
warning of "unexpected consequences" if applied to transfers of partnership interests). For a
contemporary view of § 83 along similar lines, see Abrams, supra note 2, at 208-11, 221.
109. McKEE, supra note 108, at 5.08[3][b] at 5-50.
110. Id. at 5-50 to 5-51.
111. Although McKee's proposal applied only to a forfeitable interest, a profits interest
contingent on a performance goal is forfeitable under § 83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1)
(as amended in 2005).
112. See Gilson & Schizer. supra note 94. at 907-09 (noting that current rules immunize
aggressive valuation for safe harbor interests). Cf Postlewaite, supra note 96. at 515
(claiming that "the tax treatment of a profits interest is neither unique nor extraordinary.").
113. If§ 409A applies, deferred compensation may be required to be included in income
prior to the year of payment; in addition, the deferred income may be subject to a 20%
exercise tax and interest charges. See I.R.C. § 409A(1)(A) and (B) (2009). Profits interests
do not typically limit rights to receive distributions in a manner that would satisfy the
requirements of§ 409A. See Carman, supra note 13. at 115.
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§ 409A regulations treat the valuation of illiquid stock in a start-up
corporation as reasonable only if the fair market value is determined under
a reasonable valuation method that takes relevant factors into account." 4
Under these valuation guidelines, the liquidation-value methodology is
patently unreasonable: it ignores factors relevant to valuation and creates a
fictional liquidation that bears no relationship to the parties' intent. This
fictional approach may well encourage misvaluation in related areas in
which the liquidation-value methodology would be clearly abusive.' 15  If
the concern is merely to coordinate § 710 with existing law, a much
narrower fix should suffice that would not override the general principles of
§ 83 in the partnership context.'6
Since § 83 was added in 1969, Congress has enacted significant
legislation-including § 409A and most recently § 457A-accelerating
income and imposing penalties in the case of certain deferred compensation
arrangements.' 17  These complex provisions potentially impact the
treatment of compensatory profits interests and amounts recharacterized as
ordinary income under proposed § 710.118 If Congress proceeds further
with the carried interest legislation, it will be necessary to consider
carefully the interactions between these provisions and § 710. More
broadly, the issue is whether a compensatory partnership interest should be
treated like other property for purposes of § 83 and related provisions
governing deferred compensation arrangements. Since the current entity
classification rules greatly narrow the substantive differences between
partnerships and corporations, it is not clear why profits interests should be
treated so differently from nonqualified stock options which they
114. See Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(iv)(B)(1) and (2) (2007).
115. See, e.g., Gilson & Schizer, supra note 94, at 908 n.113 (suggesting possibility of
"wrapping" a corporation in a partnership); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch,
Family Limited Partnerships: Discounts, Options, and Disappearing Value, 6 FLA. TAX.
REv. 649, 671-72 (2004) (noting that "value ... disappears from the transfer tax base under
existing law as a result of inconsistent valuation assumptions").
116. See Prop. § 710(c)(2)(C). If both Prop. § 710 and § 83 apply. the concern is
apparently that the fair value of a profits interest could potentially be taxed twice. See ABA
Comments, supra note 11, at 16-17. Alternatively, the concern may be that the liquidation-
value presumption is inconsistent with the language of § 83 concerning the "fair market
value" of an interest. See Harvey & Lee, supra note 104, at 98. 102 n.97.
117. I.R.C. § 457A addresses deferral of compensation paid by a tax-indifferent party
(such as a foreign corporation located in a tax haven whose income is not subject to U.S.
tax). In this situation, deferral of the service-provider's income is not offset by any tax
detriment to the payor.
118. The Levin bill no longer provides that recharacterized income will be treated as
compensation for performing services. See Carol Kulish Harvey & James B. Sowell.
Proposals on Carried Interests, BUSINESS ENTITIES 4. 10 n.22 (July/August 2009)
(suggesting that this change may be intended to "ameliorate" problems that could otherwise
arise under §§ 409A and 457A).
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resemble. 119
In summary, there has been virtually no public discussion of the
proposed amendment to § 83 based on the partnership tax bar's
recommendations. While the proposed amendment may be portrayed as
merely codifying the Service's prior administrative guidance, it overrides
general § 83 principles applicable to all other transfers of property for
services. If the Service's prior administrative guidance was excessively
lenient and arguably helped to give rise to the carried interest problem, the
solution should not be to codify such guidance in the guise of reform.
Allowing easy access to partnership status for profits holders who own
option-like interests will only lead to yet more complicated partnership
rules to prevent abusive trading of tax characteristics. Such complexity will
inevitably spill over into routine non-abusive transactions while rendering
Subchapter K even more inaccessible and opaque except to highly-skilled
partnership tax specialists who have the ability to exploit intricate rules for
the benefit of their clients. Safe harbor treatment for profits interests should
be reserved for non-abusive arrangements in which the tax tensions
between the partners provide an adequate safeguard against joint-tax
minimization.
C. Compensatory Options Versus Profits Interests
Because partnership profits interests and options are often close
economic substitutes, it is useful to consider how § 710 might affect the
choice between these alternative forms of compensation. Under current
law, profits interests are typically viewed as more tax efficient than
compensatory partnership options.120 Even though the profits holder is
taxed currently on his share of partnership income, the character of the
income may be capital rather than ordinary. By contrast, the option holder
defers taxation until exercise of the option but is taxed entirely on ordinary
income at the time of exercise. If § 710 operates as intended, however, it
would eliminate the profit holder's benefit of capital-gain conversion,
without altering the timing of income recognition. Section 710 would thus
dramatically alter the relative tax efficiency of these alternative forms of
compensation.' 2' A profits holder would be taxed sooner than an option
119. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2009). 301.7701-3 (as amended in
2007) (elective classification of eligible business entities as corporations or partnerships).
120. See generally James Sowell, Partners as Employees: A Proposal for Analyzing
Partner Compensation, 90 TAx NOTES 375 (2001) (discussing use of options to ensure
employee status).
121. Proposed § 710 apparently does not apply to a compensatory option to acquire a
partnership interest. See Prop. § 710(d) (disqualified interests); Schler, supra note 13, at 852
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holder but would no longer enjoy any conversion benefit. An option should
thus prove relatively more tax-efficient than a profits interest, since the
service provider would defer recognition of ordinary income until exercise
of the option and all interim investment return would be taxed solely at
LP's zero rate.122 Sensibly, the parties should opt out of § 710 if option
treatment produces a better joint-tax result.
Example (3)-European Option Alternative. Building on the same
facts in Example (1), assume that GP's profits interest is restructured as a
European option exercisable immediately prior to liquidation of P. The
receipt of the option is tax free, since the option lacks a readily
ascertainable fair market value. 123 Under current law, tax-exempt LP is
taxed on P's entire gain of $5 million realized prior to exercise of the
option, since GP is not treated as a partner. Upon exercise of the option,
GP recognizes ordinary income of $1 million (the liquidation value of GP's
acquired capital interest) and LP receives a worthless ordinary income
deduction (or offsetting capital loss) to reflect the compensation paid to
GP.124 Since LP is tax exempt, the investment return on P's assets is
entirely untaxed and GP defers recognition of ordinary income until
liquidation.
From GP's perspective, a compensatory option is tax advantaged
because it permits deferral of the tax (the equivalent of yield exemption)
until exercise of the option. 125 If GP instead received a profits interest and
were taxed under § 710, GP would be taxed on $1 million of ordinary
income in Year 2 equal to GP's 20% share of P's $5 million of gain. Thus,
profits treatment would accelerate the ordinary income tax on GP's
compensation even though GP's carry is not actually earned until Year 5. If
the goal is to minimize the parties' joint-tax liability, the most sensible
strategy would be to treat GP as an option holder, so that all investment
return is taxed at LP's zero rate. Stated differently, structuring GP's
compensation as a profits interest in Example (1) saves taxes only because
(noting confusion concerning application of Prop. § 710(d) to options to acquire stock).
122. The proposed 2005 regulations request comments concerning whether an anti-
abuse rules is needed in such circumstances. See REG-105-346-03, supra note 32,
Preamble, § 1.
123. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (as amended in 2004).
124. LP's basis is initially increased to $45 million ($40 million plus $5 million gain): if
the expense were capitalized. LP would recognize a $1 million capital loss ($44 million
distribution less $45 million basis) upon liquidation.
125. GP is treated in the same manner as an employee who receives a nonqualified stock
option (NQSO) and defers ordinary income from grant until exercise of an option. See
Walker, supra note 5, at 711 (positing an employee's "hypothetical outside investment in an
NQSO" and noting that "deferral effectively eliminates the tax on the outside investment
return").
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it allows conversion of GP's salary into capital gain. If conversion is no
longer possible under § 710, an option minimizes joint taxes because it
allows yield exemption and longer deferral.
As illustrated in Example (1), current-law profits treatment also
allows GP to borrow interest-free from LP, subject to a potential clawback
of unearned carry. In terms of the partners' economic arrangement, a
European option is not economically equivalent to a profits interest unless
GP can borrow explicitly (without interest) from LP to replicate the cash-
flow consequences of early distributions. If GP borrows explicitly from
LP, the "loan" may be treated as a below-market interest loan under §
7872.12 GP would have imputed income (the foregone interest) potentially
offset by an imputed interest deduction (the deemed interest payment). 2 If
the interest income and deduction offset each other, the net result is that GP
defers recognition of ordinary income until liquidation, when GP exercises
the option and repays the loan principal. 128  Thus, GP may be able to
replicate the cash-flow consequences of profits treatment if the arrangement
is restructured as an option coupled with an explicit (rather than implicit)
loan.
Taxing GP upon exercise of a European option is equivalent to
taxing GP's compensation as a nonpartner payment under § 707(a)(2)(A)
and deferring inclusion until distribution. 129 Setting aside the issue of
capital-gain conversion, deferral of GP's income inclusion is essentially no
different from the result that GP could obtain through a contractual deferred
compensation arrangement, as long as GP is willing to incur a substantial
126. Section 7872 applies to a below-market loan between an employer and an
employee or between an independent contractor and the person for whom such contractor
provides services. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B) (2009). It also applies to a below-market loan
between a "partnership and a partner . . . acting other than in his capacity as a member of the
partnership." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c)(1). 50 Fed. Reg. 33553. 33560 (Aug. 20.
1985). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(e), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33561 (Aug. 20.
1985) (tax-avoidance loan).
127. If applicable, the investment interest limitation under § 163(d) could limit GP's
ability to obtain an ordinary income deduction for the deemed payment of interest. See
I.R.C. § 163(d) (2009). See also I.R.C. § 163(d)(4)(B)(iii) (2009) (affording election that
effectively permits the deduction for investment interest to offset only gain taxed at the 15%
rate). If GP is treated as using the deemed loan principal in a trade or business or has
sufficient "net investment income" from other sources, the § 163(d) limit is not binding. See
Sanchirico. supra note 5. at 1141 n.181.
128. Of course, an explicit loan from LP to GP might expose implicit subsidies
embedded in the opaque distribution rules when a profits interest is used. See supra notes
57-61 and accompanying text.
129. Under current law, GP is likely not treated as having constructively received
amounts that are merely credited to his capital account, unless GP has a right to withdraw
such amounts immediately. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174. But see I.R.C. §
707(c) (2009) (potentially accelerating the timing of GP's inclusion).
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risk of forfeiture.130 Indeed, GP could obtain the same deferral benefit if he
received a restricted capital interest, since the partnership's investment
return prior to vesting of GP's interest would be taxed entirely to LP. In
this light, it is strange that Congress should enact a complex statutory fix
while allowing the parties freely to opt out of § 710 to minimize their joint-
tax liability when LP is tax-exempt.
By focusing narrowly on GP's one-sided deferral and conversion,
reformers failed to consider the ready availability of deferral through
alternative compensation arrangements such as options and restricted
capital interests. Although § 710 could conceivably be viewed as an anti-
deferral provision, this view does not make sense if alternative
compensation arrangements permit yield exemption and even longer
deferral than profits interests. As a practical matter, the parties should opt
in or out of § 710 depending on whether that provision minimizes taxes by
comparison to alternative compensation forms. To understand the joint-tax
incentives under § 710, it is essential to understand the operation of the
earned capital exception when implicit salary is reinvested in the enterprise
and distributions are deferred.
III. EARNED CAPITAL-THE BIFURCATION APPROACH
Unlike the manager of a private equity fund, service partners in
traditional partnerships typically receive cash distributions only after the
investor partners' capital has been repaid. When a service partner receives
implicit salary and leaves the previously taxed salary in the partnership, the
service partner's share of partnership capital will increase each year.
Indeed, the full complexity and unadministrability of § 710 only becomes
apparent once one examines the partnership tax bar's technical solution to
the problem of earned capital that Congress initially overlooked. Under this
bifurcation approach, a single profits stream would be divided annually into
separate components consisting of labor return and investment return on
reinvested implicit salary. The partnership tax bar has devised a truly
ingenious and wonderfully complex solution that purports to disentangle
the separate components of a service provider's return: a service provider
would be taxed on a constantly shifting mix of ordinary income from labor
and capital gain from labor converted into earned capital. Unfortunately,
the existing capital account system is wholly inadequate to prevent
130. See Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1131-33 (discussing deferral alternatives); id. at
1133 (suggesting the strictures of § 409A are "orthogonal" to the carried interest debate
because they are only intended to affect "attempts to end run the requirement [that the]
promise of future payment remain subject to creditors' claims").
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understatement of compensatory return (and overstatement of investment
return), and the government lacks resources to police self-serving
misvaluations. The preferable approach, assuming § 710 is enacted, would
be to treat a service partner's entire profits share as ordinary income.
A. Earned Capital
Section 710 rests on an elaborate fiction: GP is deemed to own
qualified capital before GP actually earns such capital under the terms of
the partners' economic arrangement. If GP's right to carry is contingent on
attainment of a performance goal, profits allocations to GP cannot have
substantial economic effect under the § 704(b) regulations governing
allocation of items of income and loss among partners.13 1 The reason why
such allocations cannot have substantial economic effect is quite simple: if
the service partner forfeits his interest, he will never bear the burden or
receive the benefit of the income and loss allocated to him. Nevertheless, §
710 treats each allocation of profits to GP as a closed transaction with
respect to a portion of GP's profits interest. 132 Under this closed transaction
approach, GP is treated as owning an increasing share of partnership capital
from reinvested earnings even though GP may ultimately forfeit such
capital. When GP is taxed on implicit salary and leaves the salary in the
firm, § 710 treats the arrangement as a cash salary reinvestment plan,
analogous to a deferred compensation arrangement in which an employee
invests through an employer. 133
Surprisingly, § 710 did not originally include any exception for
earned capital. Quite correctly, the partnership tax bar criticized this
omission as inconsistent with distributive-share treatment under the normal
rules of Subchapter K. In response to the bar's comments, the current bill
expands the definition of qualified capital to include earned capital
attributable to retained earnings, thereby increasing the complexity of the
partnership rules which are "already formidably complex." 134 Crediting GP
131. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (as amended in 2008). Under the 2005 proposed
regulations, special allocations to a service partner while his interest remains subject to
forfeiture may be deemed to have economic effect if the partners agree to elaborate
"forfeiture allocations." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(xii), 70 Fed. Reg. 29675, 29681
(May 24. 2005).
132. By contrast, a dividend on unvested stock (absent a § 83(b) election) is treated as
compensation income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2003).
133. See Sanchirico, supra note 5, at 1141 (referring to cash salary reinvestment plan);
Gergen, supra note 12, at 140 (referring to a '"compensation reinvestment plan' akin to a
dividend reinvestment plan").
134. NYSBA Report, supra note 11, at 19; id at 21 (arguing that the former definition
of invested capital was "far too restrictive" and would "grossly overstate" the ordinary
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with earned capital attributable to reinvested salary is a logical corollary of
§ 710's hybrid approach. In the partnership tax bar's view, treating GP's
reinvested salary as earned capital simply avoids the need for a tax-
prompted distribution followed by a contribution of the distributed amount.
This rationale may not be quite right, however, since GP's earned capital
would not necessarily be burdened with the cost of the carried interest
itself.3 5  Rather, the bifurcation approach disaggregates GP's return
without having any affect on the other partners. This peculiar approach is a
byproduct of the decision to leave LP's treatment unchanged under § 710.
Because GP is entitled to an investment return on reinvested salary,
the earned capital exception is central to the operation of § 710. In effect, §
710 subdivides GP's profits share into separate streams of income and taxes
less than GP's entire profits allocation as ordinary income. The
disaggregation (or carve out) approach has no counterpart under existing
Subchapter K: GP's entire profits share is reduced by the carved out
investment return on previously-taxed salary, and only the reduced profits
share is taxed as ordinary income. Consistent with the fundamental tradeoff
that leaves LP's treatment unchanged, disaggregation affects only the
character of GP's overall return (not the actual dollars received by GP).
Section 710 decomposes GP's profits share into two streams of income,
consisting of ordinary income (sourced to GP's profits interest) and an
investment return (sourced to reinvested salary).136 Over time, a portion of
P's investment return is shifted from LP to GP, as GP acquires an increased
proportional interest in partnership capital attributable to retained earnings.
B. Cash Salary Reinvestment Plan
Taxing the compensatory and investment components of a service
income element of a service partner's interest). The earned capital exception can be viewed
as simply an extension of the broader problem of determining proportionality when a service
partner acquires both a capital interest and a disproportionate profits interest.
135. See Harvey & Sowell, supra note 118, at 9 n. 20. If GP actually "purchased" an
additional capital interest in P by reinvesting salary, the consequences would be as follows:
(1) LP would be entitled to 80% of P's entire investment less x% attributable to GP's newly-
acquired interest. (2) GP's x% of the investment return would be stacked on top of GP's
undiminished profits share and (3) GP would be treated as paying salary to himself. Clearly.
the parties do not intend this result.
136. Unless GP is treated as having two separate partnership interests, the concept of
earned capital makes little sense. Nevertheless, Prop. § 710 retains the concept of a unitary
partnership basis. See Joel Scharfstein, Proposed Carried Interest Legislation: The
Interaction of Invested Capital and Book-Ups, 87 TAXES 151, 153 (2009) (proposing an
approach under which a service partner would be treated as having "two interests, a pure
invested capital interest and a pure noninvested capital interest").
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partner's return may be viewed as posing familiar problems of deferred
compensation when an employee invests deferred salary through an
employer. If GP actually received cash compensation (rather than carry)
and reinvested the cash compensation in the partnership, GP would be
entitled to an investment return taxed potentially as capital gain. As
illustrated below, the imputed cash salary reinvestment plan is equivalent to
(1) taxing GP on the discounted present value of GP's implicit salary at
ordinary income rates and (2) taxing GP (at GP's rates) on investment gain
(otherwise taxable to LP at a zero rate) that accrues on GP's reinvested
salary at the rate of return earned by P. Since GP is taxed at a higher rate
than tax-exempt LP, shifting investment income from LP to GP should, in
theory, be tax disadvantageous. The extra tax burden should be equal to the
capital gain tax (at GP's rate) on the shifted investment income that would
otherwise be taxed at LP's zero rate. If § 710 actually increases the
partners' joint-tax liability, however, the partnership could potentially work
around § 710 by substituting an option for a profits interests. If such
substitution does not occur, one reason may be that § 710 would provide
opportunities to understate the compensation component of GP's return,
saving taxes equal to the difference between the ordinary income tax rate
(35%) and the capital gain rate (15%). Stated differently, § 710 could
reintroduce similar capital-gain conversion opportunities as under existing
profits treatment.
From the government's perspective, § 710 may thus be less
advantageous than taxing GP in the same manner as an option holder.
Deferring tax until exercise of an option is equivalent to taxing investment
return at a zero rate but taxing GP's implicit salary and the earnings on such
implicit salary at ordinary income rates. Leaving aside who is taxed on the
investment return (LP or GP), option treatment does not permit capital-gain
conversion because the total amount received on exercise is taxed at
ordinary income rates.
Example (4)-Coinvestment By GP and Government. At the
beginning of Year 1, GP and LP form P, an investment partnership. GP
receives a 20% interest in P's profits (with a liquidation value of zero); LP
contributes $100 and is entitled to the remaining 80% of P's profits. P's
assets double in value each year, and P realizes gain of $100 in Year 1,
$200 in Year 2, and $400 in Year 3. All profits are retained until
liquidation of P at the end of Year 3. Upon formation, LP owns all of P's
capital. On December 31, Year 1, P pays implicit salary of $20 to GP (20%
x $100 gain) taxed entirely as ordinary income. In each subsequent year,
GP is allocated 20% of profits ($40 in Year 2 and $80 in Year 3). Under
the cash salary reinvestment plan, GP is credited with earned capital of $20
from GP's share of Year I profits; at the rate of appreciation of the
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partnership's assets, GP's earned capital of $20 would grow to $80 ($20 x 2
x 2) at the end of Year 3. Thus, GP's share of Year 2 profits is taxed partly
as ordinary income ($20) and partly as capital gain ($20, i.e., the investment
return on GP's unwithdrawn salary from the prior year). GP's share of
Year 3 profits is again taxed partly as ordinary income ($20) and partly as
capital gain ($60, i.e., the investment return on GP's unwithdrawn salary
from both prior years).137
If the tax on GP's salary is deferred, the result is that GP will
eventually be taxed at ordinary income rates on the accumulated amount
(both the original compensation and investment return) when withdrawn
from the partnership. Deferral of the tax means that GP and the
government effectively become co-investors in P; as a co-investor, the
government should be entitled to 35% of GP's pretax investment in the
partnership.138  At the end of Year 1, GP contributes $13, and the
government contributes $7 ($20 x 0.35) to P; together, they own $20 of P's
total capital of $200 (10%) and LP owns the remaining $180 (90%). Since
P's assets double in value each year, GP earns an investment return of $39
($13 in Year 2 and $26 in Year 3) on his invested capital of $13; and the
government earns an investment return of $21 ($7 in Year 2 and $14 in
Year 3) on its invested capital of $7.139 At the end of Year 2, GP
contributes an additional $13 and the government contributes an additional
$7 (35% x $20) to P; together they own $60 of P's total capital of $400
(15%), and LP owns the remaining $340 (85%).140 During Year 3, GP
earns an investment return of $13 and the government earns an investment
return of $7 on the additional contributions. At the end of Year 3, P pays
137. The $60 of investment return in Year 3 can be viewed equivalently as GP's 15%
proportionate share based on relative capital accounts ($60/$400) of the partnership's total
profits ($400): alternatively, the $60 of investment return can be viewed as twice GP's
capital account balance at the end of Year 2 ($60), since the partnership's assets double in
value each year. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., David Elkins & Christopher H. Hanna, Taxation of Supernormal Returns,
62 TAx LAW. 93, 95-97 (2009) (exploring the "partnership view" under a cash-flow
consumption tax).
139. Each partner's invested capital and return on invested capital would be as follows:
Capital Contribution Return on Capital
(End YR 1) (YR 2 and YR 3)
GP 13 13 +26
Gov 7 7+ 14
Total 20 60
140. GP's implicit Year 2 salary of $20 is equal to GP's entire Year 2 profits share of
$40 (20% x $200 profit) less the $20 imputed investment return for Year 2 (10% x $200
profit).
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implicit salary of $20 to GP and immediately liquidates.14' Upon
liquidation of P, GP and the government are entitled to the amounts in their
respective capital accounts ($140 total, or 20% of $700 increase in P's
value) and LP receives the remainder ($660).142
Now, it is possible to compare the results under the cash salary
reinvestment plan and an economically equivalent option. If GP and the
government are treated as co-investors, GP receives tax free the amount in
his capital account ($91) and the government receives the amount in its
capital account ($49). If GP instead held a European option and GP's
compensatory return were taxed on exercise, the after-tax consequences to
GP and the government would be identical. 143  The amount in the
government's capital account represents the future value of the deferred tax
on the compensation component of GP's return. The $49 of tax on GP's
salary does not yet reflect tax owed on GP's investment return. The
cumulative investment return to GP is $52 ($39 + $13) and the cumulative
investment return to the government is $28 ($21 + $7). The tax on GP's
investment return is $7.80 ($52 x 0.15), i.e., $80 x 0.0975.144 The
government's investment return ($28) is not a tax; instead, it is merely the
government's return as a co-investor.145 The total investment return ($80)
is the sum of the investment return on each co-investor's capital account.
141. GP's implicit Year 3 salary of $20 is equal to GP's entire Year 3 profits share of
$80 (20% x $400 profit) less the $60 imputed investment return for Year 3 (15% x $400
profit).
142. The partners' respective capital accounts are as follows:
Capital Accounts
GP Gov GP/Gov LP
Initial 0 0 0 100
EndYR I 13 7 20 180
End YR 2 39 21 60 340
End YR 3 91 49 140 660
143. On exercise of the option, GP would receive $140 (20% x $700 increase in P's
value) and would owe tax of $49 (35% x $140), leaving GP with $91 ($140 less $49 tax).
144. The tax of $7.80 on GP's portion of the investment return is equal to the tax on the
entire investment return ($80) times 0.0975, i.e.. 0.15 x (1 - 0.35); it is assumed that the
investment return is taxed entirely at the end of Year 3. See Walker, supra note 5. at 762-63
(proposing special surtax on the gain component of equity compensation payouts at the
special rate of 9.75% to replicate the effect of taxation at the date of grant). Proposed § 710
could be viewed as imposing "surrogate taxation" of the investment return attributable to
GP's reinvested implicit salary when LP is tax exempt. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in
Disguise: Taxing the Time Value of Money, 95 YALE L.J. 506, 523 (1986) (explaining
substitute tax approach). Yet, Prop. § 710 applies whether or not LP is tax exempt.
145. See Elkins & Hanna, supra note 138, at 96.
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To summarize, the cash salary reinvestment plan divides GP's
return into two components: a compensatory component and an investment
component. The investment component consists of the yield (at P's rate of
return) on GP's reinvested salary. GP's total compensatory return ($140) is
taxed as ordinary income under both the cash reinvestment plan and option
alternative. The only difference is that, under the cash salary reinvestment
plan, the investment return on GP's reinvested salary is taxed to GP (at
capital gain rates), thereby curtailing the benefit of yield exemption. By
opting out of § 710, however, GP can restore yield exemption if he receives
an option rather than a profits interest. Under the option alternative, all of
the investment return is taxed at LP's zero rate, leaving GP in the same
position as an employee who defers compensation through a tax-exempt
employer.
The co-investment analogy illustrates that if § 710 operated
according to its goals, it would tax GP on the discounted present value of
his compensation income, while imputing an investment return (taxed as
capital gain) on GP's reinvested salary. In present-value terms, current and
deferred taxation of the compensation component of GP's return should be
equivalent.146 Since the tax is imposed on the augmented payout, deferring
taxation of GP's implicit salary does not necessarily leave the government
worse off: the "loan" from the government is "repaid at an interest rate
reflecting the taxpayer's rate of return on investment." 4 7 Under § 710, a
portion of the investment return is shifted from LP to GP (and taxed at GP's
rate); as a result, the government collects a capital gain tax on the
investment return on reinvested salary that it would otherwise forego if the
parties had structured the transaction as a European option. The "extra"
capital gain tax is simply the tax on the investment return on GP's
reinvested salary which would compound tax free if GP were permitted to
invest through LP (GP's tax-exempt employer).148 Since this type of joint-
tax arbitrage occurs whenever compensation is deferred and the employer is
tax exempt, however, it is not clear that § 710 is needed to address this
146. By analogy to a traditional IRA, deferring the tax on GP's salary and taxing the
accumulated amount is equivalent to taxing the initial salary and exempting the investment
return. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption- Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1126 (1974) ("[D]eferring the tax is the equivalent of imposing the
tax initially, but exempting any subsequent profit due to continued investment of what is left
after payment of the tax."); Walker, supra note 5, at 711.
147. Halperin, supra note 144. at 532: id. at 533 (noting that the government "does not
necessarily lose when it 'lends' by deferring inclusion of an employee's income" if the
private parties earn a higher rate of return).
148. See id at 539-50 (suggesting that the tax advantages of nonqualified deferred
compensation could be significantly curtailed by taxing currently-at the employee's rates-
the investment income earned on the deferred compensation).
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problem.149
If one objects to GP's ability to obtain IRA-like yield exemption
when LP is tax-exempt, then the problem is not necessarily cured by § 710
which merely encourages a shift from profits treatment to option treatment.
Once again, the problem of joint-tax arbitrage results not from a flaw in the
treatment of profits interests but rather from GP's ability to exploit LP's
tax-exempt status. If LP were taxable, option treatment would not result in
any joint-tax advantage (or disadvantage) because investment return would
be fully taxed. Whether the investment return is taxed at LP's rate or GP's
rate is a matter of indifference if both parties are same taxed, since someone
must always be taxed on the investment return.
Example (4) ignores all of the problems of valuing P's illiquid
assets, the timing of gain accrual, the reasonableness of returns to qualified
capital, and the passthrough of losses. As a partner, GP benefits from the
ability to use losses that are worthless to LP. In addition, GP's share of
subsequent losses is treated as ordinary to the extent of prior ordinary
income taxed to GP under § 710. Once the passthrough of losses is taken
into account, the parties' joint-tax burden may be significantly less under §
710 than if GP held a European option.
Example (5) Loss Passthrough. The facts are the same as in
Example (4), except that the operation of P is extended to include an
additional year (Year 4) in which P realizes a loss of $300, allocated $60 to
GP and $240 to LP. Overall, P realizes a net gain of $400 ($700 gain less
$300 loss). If P liquidates at the end of Year 4, GP earns carry of $80 (20%
x $400 net gain). GP's share of the capital loss is likely treated as an
ordinary loss and allowed to the extent that such loss does not exceed the
excess (if any) of "aggregate net income with respect to" GP's service
interest for all prior years over "the aggregate net loss with respect to such
interest not disallowed [under § 710] for all prior partnership taxable
years."o If the capital loss of $60 is treated as an ordinary loss that offsets
GP's ordinary income from all prior years ($60), GP is taxed on net capital
gain of $80.'1 Given the lack of any mechanism for separating GP's
149. In the corporate context, a taxable employer can effectively invest tax free on
behalf of an employee by investing in its own securities and holding the stock for the
employee's benefit-rather than issuing the stock directly to the employee; the employer's
gain on its own stock is nontaxable under § 1032. See id. at 540.
150. See Prop. § 710(a)(2)(A).
151. GP's overall return is as follows:
I IY1 IYR2 YR3 YR4
01 20 20 20 (60)
CG 20 60
40 [Vol. 1: 1
2010] THE SOUND AND FURY OF CARRIED INTEREST REFORM
service interest and GP's qualified capital interest, it seems likely that GP is
taxed on net capital gain of $80, since (ordinary) losses offset (ordinary)
income. 152
By contrast, if GP held a European option, GP would recognize $80
of ordinary income (20% of $400 net increase in P's value) at the end of
Year 4. Since GP performs the identical services, GP should be taxed
equivalently in both situations; otherwise, LP and GP derive a joint-tax
benefit from structuring the transaction formally as a profits interest rather
than a European option. If P is sufficiently profitable on a net basis, GP
will eventually receive compensation measured by the amount of P's total
profits (not a reduced percentage of P's profits augmented by an imputed
investment return on GP's reinvested salary). Despite the carefully-
contrived optics, the capital credited to GP can be viewed as remaining
LP's capital on which LP is entitled to an investment return. If the
transaction were held open, GP's entire share of profits would be taxed as
ordinary income (not as a mix of ordinary income and capital gain).
Even if some portion of GP's return is from earned capital, the "best
compromise" may be to treat GP's entire profits interest as ordinary
income.154 Alternatively, if GP were willing to forego current allocation of
losses, GP's profits share could be structured as a European option (or
vesting capital interest).
C. Shortcomings of Capital Accounts
When previously taxed implicit salary is reinvested in the
partnership, a mechanism is needed to track the separate labor and capital
components of the service provider's future return. Some reformers have
suggested that the capital account system would permit tracking of a service
partner's compensatory and investment return over the life of the
152. If the loss of $60 is instead treated as incurred "with respect to" GP's qualified
capital interest, it would offset an equivalent amount of capital gain (rather than $60 of
ordinary income), leaving GP with ordinary income of $60 and capital gain of $20 overall.
Cf Scharfstein. supra note 136, at 154 (suggesting that GP should lose the ability to claim
an ordinary loss if GP's retained earnings are treated as invested capital).
153. GP would be treated essentially as annually exercising a stock appreciation right
(SAR) as profits are allocated. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1 (Statement of Charles 1.
Kingson, July 31, 2007) (analogizing profits interest to a series of SARs).
154. See Weisbach, supra note 14, at 755 n.91 (noting that, even if a portion of GP's
return "is capital income in the sense that it represents returns that are left in the business
rather than taken out each year as salary," the "best compromise [may be] to treat it all as
labor income exactly as we do in the case of restricted stock or nonqualified options").
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partnership."' The obvious difficulty, however, is that the elaborate capital
account system was never intended to serve this function. Instead, it is
intended merely to police allocations among partners that seek to minimize
joint taxes. Since partnerships are not required to maintain capital accounts
in accordance with the elaborate rules of § 704(b), many (perhaps most) do
not. The "intellectual revolution" built around capital-account analysis
remains highly imperfect and it would require a tremendous infusion of
government resources to ensure even minimally adequate compliance.15 6
As the experience with the § 704(b) regulations amply
demonstrates, the ability of sophisticated planners to abuse even well-
crafted rules should not be underestimated. The capital account rules are
not designed to police valuation abuses that § 710 would invite.' 7 Jointly,
LP and GP will often have a common incentive to overstate the capital
component (and understate the compensation component) of GP's return. It
is well understood, under current law, that "[a]sset valuation is the Achilles
heel of the system of capital accounts analysis."" 8 Without adversity of
interests, it is impossible to police self-serving valuations intended to
understate or overstate asset values. The partnership tax bar has suggested
that future regulations should permit bookups (or bookdowns) of invested
capital, expanding opportunities for misvaluation; requiring mandatory gain
recognition on a revaluation to "temper the incentive to revalue" does not
seem a practicable response to this problem. 5 9
In assessing the merits of the § 710 approach, one should focus on
the existing passthrough system, which bears little resemblance to the ideal
155. See Senate Hearings, supra note I (Statement of Mark P. Gergen, July 11, 2007).
156. See Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L.
REV. 365, 369 (2003) (suggesting that the "intellectual revolution [in capital account
analysis] will not become a revolution in the practical reality of partnership taxation"): cf
Mark P. Gergen. The End of the Revolution in Partnership Tax?. 56 SMU L. REV. 343
(2003).
157. To address the problem of special allocations, a recent ALI project considered but
rejected the notion of reforming capital accounts to take into account time value of money
concerns and proper adjustments for risk. See generally George K. Yin & David J. Shakow,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PROJECT, TAXATION OF PRIVATE
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: REPORTERS' STUDY (1999).
158. Gergen, supra note 156, at 362. By rendering Subchapter K even more complex
and opaque. Prop. § 710 may undermine the prospects of more thoroughgoing reform while
exacerbating the need for such reform.
159. Gergen. supra note 12. at 146 (suggesting immediate gain recognition on a
revaluation as a "simple way to temper the incentive to revalue"); cf NYSBA Report. supra
note 11, at 5 (inviting future regulatory guidance concerning "adjustment[s] to existing
invested capital to reflect any unrealized gain or loss related to such invested capital" on a
subsequent contribution or distribution). The current rules explicitly permit a revaluation of
partnership property only when the parties can realistically be expected to have "sufficiently
adverse interests." See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(h) (as amended in 2008).
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envisioned by some reformers. Within the current system of flexible
allocations backstopped by an array of anti-abuse rules, imputing a
reasonable return on reinvested salary based on capital account balances
may merely mask the fundamentally insoluble problem of separating
returns to labor and investment.1o Without a baseline of proportionate
allocations, it is impossible to tell whether an allocation is
disproportionate.161 Special allocations are permitted based on the notion
that partners should be free to allocate items among themselves in a manner
that matches the flexibility of their business arrangement. The underlying
presumption is that such flexibility is tolerable because the partners are
likely to have adverse interests. The notion of offsetting benefits and
detriments-the justification for allowing flexible allocations under
Subchapter K-is the antithesis of the § 710 approach which alters only the
tax consequences to service partners.
Congress has barely begun to consider the myriad challenges of
integrating § 710 with the already excessively intricate provisions of
partnership tax. For example, Congress would need to coordinate § 710
with the collapsible partnership rules of § 751 governing sales of interests
and disproportionate distributions.16 2 When a service partner's interest is
sold, it would be necessary to bifurcate the amount realized between the
ordinary-income and capital-gain components even though gain at the
partnership level consists solely of capital gain.163 Except on sale of an
interest, Congress seems quite oblivious to the potential shifting of ordinary
income and capital gain with respect to the service partner's interest. 164
While § 710 refers expressly to § 751(a) governing sales of partnership
interests, it ignores § 751(b), the companion provision governing
160. See David A. Weisbach. Professor Says Carried Interest Legislation is Misguided,
116 TAX NOTES 505, 510 (2007) ("The Levin bill simply glosses over [the] central problem,
hiding its complexities behind a rule that allocations must be reasonable.").
161. See Weisbach, supra note 14, at 756 ("There is no way to draft laws or regulations
that identify any potential service component to the capital allocation."); id (noting that
challenges by the Service would be expensive and time-consuming, with the Service having
"little chance of winning except in egregious cases"); see also Rosenzweig, supra note 23, at
729 (discounting the possibility that "adding the additional complexities of the partnership
accounting rules into the mix will lead to a more rational or implementable solution" to the
problem of blended returns to labor and capital).
162. See I.R.C. § 751(a) (2009) (sales). § 751(b) (2009) (disproportionate distributions).
A disposition of a service partner's interest would trigger recognition of ordinary income
notwithstanding otherwise applicable provisions. See Prop. § 710(b)(1).
163. See Gergen, supra note 12, at 146 ("It is not clear how a [service partners] overall
book gain should be spread across a mix of gain and loss assets. And so on.").
164. There would clearly be an incentive to specially allocate ordinary income (or short-
term capital gain) to the service partner's carried interest. See ABA Comments, supra note
11. at 21; see also NYSBA Report. supra note 11, at 59 n.151.
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distributions of partnership property. 16 Since 1954, a central tenet of
Subchapter K has been the need to prevent shifting of capital gain and
ordinary income among partners. 6 There is no justification for allowing
such shifting within the return of a single partner (GP), often with no
detriment to the other partners. Indeed, § 710 would likely provide an
opportunity for partnership tax bar to demand repeal of § 751(b).
CONCLUSION
In response to the partnership tax bar's recommendations, the
current version of carried interest legislation would expand the concept of
qualified capital and revise § 83 to entrench an unwarranted valuation
subsidy for partnership profits interest. The underlying notion is that § 710
is a substitute for the generally applicable rules of § 83 governing transfers
of property for services. By contrast, this Article suggests that § 710 will
often understate the compensation component of a service provider's return
by taxing less than all of a profits interest as ordinary income and providing
an incentive to the parties to overstate the capital component attributable to
earned capital. By amending § 83 to codify a pro-taxpayer valuation rule
for profits interests (zero value), the carried interest legislation affords
separate but not equal treatment of partnership deferred equity
compensation.16 7
Even though academic commentators have sought to clarify the
joint-tax benefits of carried interest arrangements, the current legislation
pursues a solution premised narrowly on the one-sided advantage to GP.
The pragmatic argument in favor of § 710 is that taxing at least some
portion of GP's compensation as ordinary income represents an adequate
tradeoff for preserving the current favorable treatment of LPs. 168  The
165. This omission is perhaps not surprising since reformers conspicuously failed to
mention § 751(b). See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note I (Statement of Mark P. Gergen,
July 11, 2007) (referring only to § 751(a)). Cf Prop. § 710(b)(4) (distributions of appreciated
property "with respect to" a service partners interest).
166. While conceding the need for § 751(a), the partnership tax bar generally views §
751(b) as too complex and ripe for repeal. See generally Karen C. Burke, Origins and
Evolution of § 751(b). 60 TAx LAW. 247 (2007) (discussing 1954 reform and Professor
William D. Andrews' more recent proposals).
167. While Prop. § 710 is more favorable to service providers than McKee's 1977
proposal, the latter predated the capital account regime of which McKee was the architect.
See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text; see also Abrams, supra note 2, at 197
("[M]any have come before, with essentially the same arguments leading to the same
proposed solutions.").
168. If one considers hedge funds, the "tradeoff may be more apparent than real. Since
GP's profits (as hedge fund manager) consist mostly of short-term capital gain (already
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recharacterization approach is neither simple nor straightforward: it will
often yield illogical results and inevitably collide with other provisions of
Subchapter K. Having helped to identify important defects in the current
proposal, the partnership tax bar seems increasingly reconciled to § 710's
recharacterization approach should reform go forward. Nevertheless, a
"workable" solution from the bar's perspective may be quite different from
a coherent or administrable reform. Indeed, the current proposal's
unintended effects, electivity, and lack of transparency illustrate why it is
essential to consider tradeoffs and implementation from a joint-tax
-169perspective.
While one commentator has dismissed the proposed reform as "a
bad idea badly executed" that deserves to fail, the dynamics of carried
interest legislation are considerably more complex.o7 0 Having confidently
identified the underlying problem as one-sided conversion and deferral,
well-intentioned reformers suggested the purportedly simple solution of
recharacterizing a service partner's share of partnership income. Unable to
craft workable rules implementing this simple solution, Congress turned to
the partnership tax bar which recommended changes that would complicate
yet further the existing partnership rules, without adequately addressing
potential joint-tax arbitrage. Indeed, under the Administration's budget
proposal, the carried interest legislation could potentially affect service
partners in all partnerships, inflicting considerable damage on routine
business arrangements that pose little or no potential for abuse. Rather than
enact complex legislation of uncertain scope, Congress should consider
delegating authority to Treasury under existing provisions to address
capital-gain conversion and limit advantageous trading of tax
characteristics.
taxed essentially like ordinary income), Prop. § 710 would affect mainly the character of
gain (ordinary or capital) on sale of a hedge fund manager's interest. Cf Kingson. Carried
Interests: An Outdated Term?. supra note 70. at 127 (current case law refutes the claim that
sale of "contracts to manage [a] hedge fund" results in capital gain).
169. From a "global" perspective, it is important to consider the government's limited
resources to enforce any solution without diverting attention from other partnership abuses.
See Walker, supra note 5, at 699 n.10 (adopting the term "global" to describe the employer-
employee joint-tax perspective and specifically referring to "the third actor in this play, the
Treasury").
170. Abrams. supra note 2, at 227.
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